University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
1991

Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy
Dorothy E. Roberts
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law
Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, Gender and Sexuality Commons, Inequality and
Stratification Commons, Law and Gender Commons, Law and Race Commons, Law and Society
Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, Legal History Commons, Privacy Law
Commons, Race and Ethnicity Commons, and the Social Control, Law, Crime, and Deviance Commons

Repository Citation
Roberts, Dorothy E., "Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of
Privacy" (1991). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1370.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1370

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

IVJ1AY 1991

VOLUME 104

[ H 1\. R VA RD

NUMBER 7

. r,_\ W. R t:'.. ·v I E Vv
LA
)--l

~--

1i

j

ART IC LE
PU N ISHING DRUG ADDICTS \ VHO 1.-L--\VE BABIES :
\VOMEN OF COLOE. EQUALI T Y,
AND THE EIG HT OF PRIVACY
Dorothr E. Hoberts""
Women increasingly face crililinal charges for giv ing birth to infants ·w ho
test positiv e for drugs. Most of the :oo men pmsecul eci are poor, Black, and
add ic ted to crack cocaine. hz thi s ,lrti cle, P rofe ssor R ob erts seeics to ad d
the penpective of poor Black women to the current debate o·<}er prot ecting
fetal rights at th e expen se of wome n's righ ts. Based 0 11 th e presumpt ion tlzat
Black women experience se<.1 eral fonn s of oppress ion simultane ously, the
author argues that the punishment of drug addic ts ·wlzo ch oose to carry th eir
pregnanci es to term vi olates their constitutional ri ght s to equal pyotection
and pri11acy regarding th eir repmdu cti <H choices Sh e begins by placing
these prosecutions in th e cont ext of th e /zistori ca l de<.>aluation of B lacl? 1.oomen
as motheYs. After presenting lz er view of th e prosecutio ns as punishing drug addicted women for having babies, the auth or argues that th is pm<ishmeni
~~iol ates the equ al prot ectio n clause beca us e it stenls fmm and perpetuates
Black sub o·rdi nation . Finally, Profes so r Roberts argues that the prose cuti ons
<>iolate women's constitu tional rights to az!IOiiOiiiY and fr ee dom f rom inc•i diou s gm,emment standards fov chil db eari ;.- _~ . liz jJrcs cnfing f1e r ·uiew that t!ze
pmse cution s v io late womeu's p ri<•acy ri g,!tts, til e auth or r.riti ques the lib eral,
"n egat ive'' conc eptio n of privacy roo te d in f rN dom .f!·om go"i.:enmzent co nstraints. Size con cludes by ad ~>o cat in g a progressiL>e conc ept of pri1.,acy !hat
pla ces an affi rmatiw obligation u;z t i; e gow m men t to gu ara nt ee iniii'ui d ual
rights and recognizes th e Cvlll lecl ion hel<.i •t en the ri ght of prh•acy ,1/ld racial
equ ality .

:;: Associa te Pro fesso r. Ru tgers C ni, ·cr~it y Sc hool of L a \v-:~c\vark. B ..l... rg ;;. \'ale Co ll e~ r· :
] . D. r 980, Han·arc! L a\1" Sc h ool. I '.l·ortld like tu th ank m1· co il eag uc,; Ho w a rd L :Jtin, ] am es
Pope , and :'>ladin e Tau b ior th e ir car e ful co m ments o n an ea rlier d:aft of t!-Ji s .'\ rt icl c . .-'.ni u
A11cn, Regina -~~ u .s tin, and I)\vi ght (;ree ne ab o r;a \T n1 c hc·lpfu l ~ ug~e:-:.tion.s:. I a m als o gratefu l
to :-\nita BrO\\·n. N ina L oc\Ycnstein. Eli zJ.bcl. h l'da: s h ~1 ! l. E ~·i c Pennin .!.!:ton. C l a udi ,;~. \V c rni ~.~ k .
a nd Andrea \Vi! E a m ~ fo r their t·esea rc!-J :t:'< i<ta'l Cc .
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Prologue

A

former slave named Lizzie Wi lliams recounted the beaiing of pregnant slave women on a A1ississippi cotton plantation: "I[']s seen
nigger women dat ·was fixin' to be confined do some thin' de white folks
didn't lik e. Dey [the white folks J would dig a hole in de ground just
big 'nuff fa' her stomach, make her li e face down an whip h er' on de
back to keep fi'om hurtin' de child ." 1
In July rg8g , Jennifer Clarise Johnson, a twenty-three-year-old
crack addict, became the first woman in the United States to be
criminally convicted for exposing her baby to drugs while pregnant. z
F lorida law enforcement officials charged Johnson with two counts of
delivering a controlled substance to a minor after her two children
tested positive for cocaine at birth. Because the relevant Florida drug
law did not apply to fetuses, 3 the prosecution invented a novel interpretation of the statute. The prosecution obtained ] ohnson's conviction for passing a cocaine metabolite from her body to her newborn
infants during the sixty-second period after birth and before the umbilical co rd was cut. 4

I.

IN TRODUCTION

A growing number of women across the country have been charged
with criminal offenses after giving birt h to babies vvho test positive
1 Johnson, Smothered Slave Injalll s .· W ere Slac' e lvlothen at Fclldt? , 47 ].S. HrsT. 493, 5 I3
(Ig8I).
2 See State v. Johnson , 0/o. E 8g-8go-CFA, slip op. at 1 (Fla. C ir. Ct. July IJ , I989), ajj'd,
No. Sg-1765 , I99I Fla. App. LEXIS 3583 (F !a Dist. CL. App. Apr. IS, 199 1); Moss, Substance
Abuse During Pregnancy, 1.3 HAR\'. WOMEN's LJ. 278 , :So-8-1- (Iggo); Rob erts, Dru g-Add icted
Women Who Have Babies . Tr.:I AL, :\pr. 1990, at 56, 56; Da \·idson , Newbo rn Drug Expos ure
Conviction a 'Drastic' Fi•·s t., L.A. Tim es, July ,:; r. I989, pt. I, at I, coL r. T he recent a ffirmance
of the 1 ohnson decision by a Florida appe als court m <!rked the first time that a state a ppeals
co urt has upheid such a conYictio n unde r la ws desi gne d to punish the di s tributio n of drugs to
children under I 3. See N.Y. T imes, ;\p r. 2 0, I99 I, at 6, col. 4·
Since Johnson's convi ction. several oth er women have bee n charged with crim es for giv ing
birth to crac k-exposed infants. Se e, e.g., State \'. Grubbs, No. 4fA-SS9--fiS Crimin a l (Alaska
Sup. Ct. Au g. 2:; , I9il9) (~e n tencing a 23 -ye::; r-old white woman tiJ si:' mo nths in jail a nd five
years probation for criminal ly ;J egl ige nt homicide in th e deat h of her two-week-oid son) ; State
v. Black, No . 89-5 325 (F la. C ir. Ct. J an . .3, I990) (oe nt encing a 32 -y.oar-old Black \Vornan to
18 mon ths in jail and 3 ~·e:us probation for distribution of drugs to a minor); State v. VVelch ,
No. go-CR-oo6 (Ky. Cir. Ct. i\Iarch 15, l C)90 ) (sentenci ng a 3.3-year-old w hite wom an to jail for
child abuse). See gen erally Paltrow (:" Shcnde. State by State C:se Summary of C riminc.l
Prosecutions Aga inst Preg na n t Women a nd Appendi x of Pu blic Health and Pu b li c Interest
Groups Opposed to Th ese Prose cution s, Oc t. : g. r 990 (unp ulJlishcd memo randum to ACLU
Affiliates a nd Inter.:sted Pa rties) (on til e at t he H an· arcl L:r,' School L ibrar:-' ) [herein after State
Case Summaryj.
3 Sec F LA. STAT . .c\ l\':o-:. § 893 . r .)(:Hc) (\ifesl. :Ou p p . i9C)OI.
-l Se e T ri al Tran sc ri pt at 2 0 - 2 4. Si-6o . 5ta!t.: ~ ~ . Jolutson lh:.~n::inafter Tria ! 1~ranscr ipt-l
(testirn o n\· of D rs. Ra ndy Ton1pkins :~nd M itche ll Ped ~ t ei n).
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for drugs. 5 T he majority of these women, like Jennifer J ohnson, are
poor and Black. 6 Most are addicted to crack cocaine. 7 The prosecution of drug-addicted mothers is part of an alarming trend towards
greater state intervention into the lives of pregnant women under the
rationale of protecting the fetus from harm. 8 This intervention has
included compelled medical treatment, greater restrictions on abortion,
and increased supervision of pregnant women's conduct.

5 Since I 98 7, at leas t so so-called "fetal a buse" cases have been brought in I 9 sta tes and the
District of Columbia. See Hoffman , Pregna nt, A ddic te d - And Gu ilty?, N. Y. T imes, Au g.
I9, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 32, 35; se e also Lewin , Drug Use in Pregnancy : New I ss ue for the
Courts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1990, at Aq, col. r (reporting that "[p]rosec utors nationwide are
putting . . drug laws to new use to deal with th e ra pidl y grow in g n umber of [d ru g-exposed]
babies"); M cNamara , Fetal Endangerment Case s on th e Rise, Boston Globe , Oct . J, I989, at
r, col. 2 (noti ng that ro new "fetal endan germent" cases had been brought nationwide in the
three months followin g the Supreme Court's decision in \Vebster v. Reproductive H ealth Servs.,
109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989)).
Several courts have recentl y di smissed such "fetal abuse" cases . See, e.g., People v. H ardy,
No. r2845 8 , 1991 Mich. App. LEXIS I35 (f..,!ich Ct. App. Apr. r, 199I); Judge Drops Charges
of Delivering Drugs to an Unborn Baby , N.Y. Times, Feb. s, 199 1, at Bli, col. 4·
6 According to a memorandum prepa red by th e ACLll Reproductin: Freedom Project, of
the 52 defendants, 35 are African-American, 14 a re white, 2 are La tina, and 1 is N a ti ve
American. S ee State Case Summary, s u p1·a note 2; Telephone interviews wi th Jose ph M erkin,
Attorney for Sharon Peters (J a n . 7, 1991 ), J::tmes Shi elds, Nor th Carolina AC LU (Ja n. 7, 1991) .
a nd Patrick Young, Attorney for Brend a Yurchak (Jan. 7, 1991); see also Kol ata, Bias Seen
Against Pregnant Addicts, N.Y. Times, July 20, r 990, at A 13, col. I (ind ic ating that of 6o
women charged, So% were min orities ). The di spropo rtio nate prosecuti on of poor B lack wo men
can be see n most clearl y in th e sta tes that hav e ini tiated th e most cases. In Florida, whe re two
women hav e been co nvicted for distributin g dru gs to a min or, 10 out of I 1 crimin a l cases were
brought against Black women. See State Case Sum mar y, s upra note 2, at 3-5. Similarly, of
18 women in South Carolin a c ha rged since August 1989 w ith eith er crimin al negl ect of a chiid
or distribution of dru gs to a min or, r 7 have been Black. See id. at r 2.
; See Hoffman, supra note 5, at 35 (noting that '·w ith the exce ption of a fe w cases, p rosecuto rs
have not go ne after pregnant a lco holics").
8 In addition to prosec utin g wo men afte r the birth of a baby for pre na tal crimes, t he ran ge
of state intrusions on pregnant women 's a utonom y includes j a iling preg nant wom en, se e infra
notes 54-5 6 a nd accompanyin g tex t; placin g the child in protective custody, see N.J. R Ev. STAT .
§ 30AC-r 1 (West 1981); allowin g tort suits by children aga inst th eir mothers for negli gent cond uct
during preg nancy, see Grodin v. Grod in , 102 Mich ..\ pp. 396, .)O l N.W.2 d 869 (r98o); ordering
forced medical tre atment performed on pregna.nt wome n, see in re A,. C., 573 A. 2d r 2 35 (D . C.
1990) ; depriving m ot hers of child custody based on ac ts during wegnanc y, see infm notes -t853 a nd accompanying text; upholdin g empl oyer policies exclu d ing fertile wo men fro m the workplace, see llAW v. J ohnson Co nt rols, In c., 88 6 F. 2d 8 71 (7 th C ir. 1989), rev 'd, I I I S. Ct. IJ96
(1991); and placing greate r restri ctions on access to abo rtion , see Webster v. Reprodu ctive Health
Se n ·s . , 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). For general th eo reti cal treatments of th e iss ues in vo lved in state
interven tion during p reg nan cy, see Gallaghe r, Preua ta! ln<casions & lntnwntions: What's H'm;zg
w ith Fetal Rights, ro HARV. Wo!I!EN 'S L. J. 9 ( 198 7l; Go ldb erg, Jhd iwi Cho ices D zo·ing
Pregnancy: Whose Decision I s I t Anyway? , 41 RuTGE RS L. REv . 59 I ( 1989); McN ulty, P regna n cy P olice: The H ealth P olicy and L egal i mplications of Punishing Pregnal!i l·Vomenfor Hann
to Th eir Fetuses, I 6 N .Y. U. R EV . L. & Soc. CHANG E 177 . 279-90 (1988) ; a nd N ote, T lu:
C;·eation of Fet al Rights: Conflic ts witlz !Vomen's Cous tlluti onal Rights to Liberty, Priw!cy, and
Equal Protec tion, 95 YA LE L.J. 599 (rg86) .
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Such government intrusion is particularly harsh for poor women
of color. 9 They are the least likely to obtain adequate prenatal care ,
the most vulnerable to government monitoring, and the least able to
conform to the white, middle-class standard of motherhood. They are
therefore the primary targets of government control.
The prosecution of drug-addicted mothers implicates two fundamental tensions. First, punishing a woman for using drugs during
pregnancy pits the state's interest in protecting the future health of a
child against the mother's interest in autonomy over her reproductive
life - interests that until recently h ad not been thought to be in
conflict. Second, such prosecutions represent one of two possible
responses to the problem of drug-exposed babies. The government
may choose either to help women have healthy pregnancies or to
punish women for their prenatal conduct. 10 Although it might seem
that the state could pursue both of these avenues at once, the two
responses are ultimately irreconcilable. Far from deterring injurious
drug use, prosecution of drug-addicted mothers in fact deters pregnant
women from using available health and counseling services because it
causes women to fear that, if they seek help, they could be reported
to government authorities and charged with a crime. 11 Moreover,
prosecution blinds the public to the possibility of nonpunitive solutions
and to the inadequacy of the nonpunitive solutions that are currently
available. 12
T he debate between those who favor protecting the rights of the
fetus and those who favor protecting the rights of the mother has
been extensively waged in the literature. 13 This Article does not repeat

9 I use the term "wome n of color" to refer to non -white women in America, includi ng Bl ack,
Latina, Asian, and N a tive Americ an women. Recog nizing the diversity of histori cal a nd cultural
backgrounds amon g women of color, this Articl e focu ses particularly on the experience of Black
women in America. \Vh en women of color are united in a commo n ex perience of oppression
a nd po \· erty, however, I draw mo re ge neral conclu sion s about constraints on their rep rod uc tive
autonom:y.
10 In 1990, lawmakers in 34 states debated bill s co ncernin g prenatal substa nce abuse. S ee
K ey Battie in War on Drugs: Savin g Pregnant vVomen, Endangered Babies, State Health Notes,
Jun e 1990, at r, col. t (published by the George Washington Un ive rsity Intergove rnmen tal
Health Policy Project). In California a lone , about 20 different bill s relating to the problem of
drug use during pregnancy were pending befo re th e legislatu re as of June 1989. See Marcotte ,
C,-ime and Pregnancy, A.B. A. ]. , Aug. r 989, at 14, q.
II See inj)'a notes rs6-157 and accompanying text.
1' Sec infm notes 87 - 89 and accompanying text.
13 For arguments suppo rti ng the mother's ri ght to autonomy, sec so urc es cited in note S.
For arguments advocat ing pro tect ion of the fetu s, see K ing , Th e Juridical Status of /.he Fet.u.>:
A Proposal for L egal Proted ion of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. R Ev. 1647, r6S2-84 (1979); Parn ess
& Prit chard, To Be or Not to B e: PYolecting th e Unborn's Pot ential ity of Life, 5 1 U . CIN. L.
REV. 257, 267-86 (1982); Robertson, Procreatil'C Lib erty and th e Con tYol of Con ce ption, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L REV. 405 , 437- 43 (1983); Walker & Puzder, Sta te Protection
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the theoretical arguments for and against state intervention. Rather,
this Article suggests that both sides of the debate have largely overlooked a critical aspect of government prosecution of drug-addicted
mothers . Can we determine the legality of the prosecutions simply by
weighing the state's abstract interest in the fetu s against the mother's
abstract interest in autonomy? Can we determine whether the prosecutions are fair simply by decidin g the duti es a pregnant woman
owes to her fetus and then assessing whether the defendant has met
them? Can we determine the constitutionality of the government's
actions without considering the race of the women being sin gled out
for prosecution?
Before de ciding whether the state's interest in preventing harm to
the fetus justifies criminal sanctions against the mother, we must first
understand the mother's competin g perspective and the reasons for
the state's choice of a punitive response. This Article seeks to illuminate the current d ebate by examinin g the experiences of the class
of women who are primarily affected - poor Black w omen.
Providing the perspective of poor Black women offe rs two advantages. First , examining legal issues from the viewpoint of those whom
they affect most 14 helps to uncover the real reasons for state action
and to explain the real harms that it causes. It exposes the way in
which the prosecutions deny poor Black wom en a facet of their humanity by punishin g their reprodu ctive choices. The government's
choice of a punitive response perpetuates the historical devalua tion of
Blac k women as mothers. Viewin g th e legal issues from the experof the Unborn After R oe v . Wad e: A Legislative Proposal , 13 STETSON L. R Ev. 237 , 253 -63
( I 984) .
14 A g row ing body of sc hola rship chall enges do min a n t-grou p sc holars ' claim s to ne u t ra lity
or u niversali ty. This new sc hol a rshi p is found ed on the reali ty of op pression . S ee M ats ud a,
Public R esponse to R ac ist Speech: Considering the Victim 's Story , 87 MIC H. L. R Ev. 2320,
2323 -2 6 ( 1989) (desc ri bi ng "outside r j ur is p ruden ce "); West , Progressi<.>e and Conservative Constitutionalism , 83 M rc H. L. R Ev. 64I , 6 78-82 , 68 4- 86 (I 990) (desc ri bi ng "id ea listic " a nd "antisu bo rdin ation progressives"). F em inist legal theo ry is perh a ps th e most established exam p le of
thi s a lternative juris p r ud ence. See , e.g. , M a cKin non , Femi ni sm, lvf arx ism, 1lfe th od , and the
State : Tow ard Feminist J misprudence , 8 SIGNS 635 (!983); Scales , The Emergence of Feminist
J uris pru de nce: A n Ess ay , 95 YA LE L.J. I 3 73 (I 98 6); West , Ju rispru den ce an d Gen de r , 55 U.
CHI. L. R Ev . r (r988).
T he sc h ola rshi p of peo pl e of color is a more rece nt var iety of a lte rn ative j u risp ru dence. See,
e.g., D . BELL , AND WE ARE NOT SAVED ( 1987); Coo k , Beyond Critical L egal Studies: The
R econstructive T heo logy of D1·. lvl artin L uther K ing, J r., 103 H ARv. L. R Ev . 985 (1990);
C rens haw , Race, R eform, and Ret renchment : Transformation and L egiti matio n in A nt idiscrimination Law , 10 1 HA Rv. L. REv. 133 1 (1988). Among this la tter grou p a re sc ho la rs w ho ,
ii ke me, a re parti cu larl y conce rn ed wit h th e lega l prob lems an d con cre te exp eriences of B lack
wome n . Th eir wo rk has in for med a nd in sp ired me. See , e.g., Austin , S apphire Bound' , 1989
W rs. L. R Ev. 53 9; Harr is, R ac e an d Ess entia lism in Fe minis t L egal Th eory, 4 2 STAN. L. R Ev .
.=;Sr (1990); Scales-T rent , B lack Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Pla ce, A sse rtin g Our
R ights , 24 HA RV . C. R. -C. L L. REv. 9 (!989).
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iential standpoint of the defendants enhances our understanding of
the constitutional dimensions of the state's conduct. 15
Second, examining the constraints on poor Black women's reproductive choices expands our understanding of reproductive freedom
in particular and of the right of privacy in general. Much of the
literature discussing reproductive freedom has adopted a white middleclass perspective, which focuses narrowly on abortion rights. The
feminist critique of privacy doctrine has also neglected many of the
concerns of poor women of color. 16
My analysis presumes that Black women experience various forms
of oppression simultaneously, 17 as a complex interaction of race, gender, and class that is more than the sum of its parts. 18 It is impossible
to isolate any one of the components of this oppression or to separate
the experiences that are attributable to one component from experiences attributable to the others. The prosecution of drug-addicted
mothers cannot be explained as simply an issue of gender
inequality. Poor Black women have been selected for punishment as
a result of an inseparable combination of their gender, race, and
economic status. Their devaluation as mothers, which underlies the
prosecutions, has its roots in the unique experience of slavery and has
been perpetuated by complex social forces.
Thus, for example, the focus of mainstream feminist legal thought
on gender as the primary locus of oppression often forces women of
color to fragment their experience in a way that does not reflect the
reality of their lives. 19 Angela Harris and others have presented a
IS For a description and critique of feminist standpoint epistemology, see Bartlett, Feminist
Legal A1 ethods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 82 9, 87 2-77 ( r 990). Bartlett criticizes feminist standpoint
epistemology because it tends to standardize women's characteristics, it denies the significance
of the viewpoints of non-victims, it does not explain di fferences of perception among women,
and it engenders adversarial politics. See id. at 873-75. These criticisms have merit. ?'Jotwithstanding the problems inherent in adopting a general feminist standpoint epistemology, I
believe there is value in the limited project of focusing on the perspective of Black women,
especially because that perspective has traditionally been ignored.
16 See infra notes 197-214, 248-25 7 and accompanyine text.
17 See Harris, supra note q, at 604 ("Far more for black women than for white women,
the experience of self is precisely that of being unable to disentangle the web of race and gender
-of being enmeshed always in multiple, often contradictory, discourses of sexuality and color'');
Kline, Race, Racism, and Feminist Legal Theory, ! 2 HARV. WOMEN 'S L.J. rrs, !2! (!989);
Scales-Trent, supra note q, at 9· The theme of the simultaneity of multiple forms of oppression
is common in Black feminist writings. See, e.g., Combahee River Collective, A Black Feminist
Statement, in THIS BRIDGE CALLED l\!Iy BACK: WRITINGS BY R'\DICAL WOMEN OF COLOR
210, 213 (C. Moraga & G. Anzaldua eels. rg8r); B. HooKs , AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK Wo:VIEN
AND FEMINISM r 2 ( r 981) ("[A]t the moment of my birth, two factors determined my de stiny,
my having been born black and my having been born female.'').
18 See Scales-Trent, supra note q , at 9 & n. 2 (noting that "race and sex interact to magnify
the effect of each independently'').
!9 Angela Harris notes the fragmentation produced by an arithmetic approach to multiple
oppression "The result of essentialism is to reduce the lives of people who experience multiple
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racial critique of this gender essentialism in feminist legal theory. 20
By introducing the voices of Black women, these critics have begun
to reconstruct a feminist jurisprudence based on the historical, economic, and social diversity of women's experiences. 21 This new jurisprudence must be used to reconsider the more particular discourse
of reproductive rights.
This Article advances an account of the constitutionality of prosecutions of drug-addicted mothers that explicitly considers the experiences of poor Black women. The constitutional arguments are based
on theories of both racial equality and the right of privacy. I argue
that punishing drug addicts who choose to carry their pregnancies to
term unconstitutionally burdens the right to autonomy over reproductive decisions. Violation of poor Black women's reproductive rights
helps to perpetuate a racist hierarchy in our society. The prosecutions
thus impose a standard of motherhood that is offensive to principles
of both equality and privacy. This Article provides insight into the
particular and urgent struggle of women of color for reproductive
freedom. Further, I intend my constitutional critique of the prose-

forms of oppression to add it ion problems: ' racism + sexism = straight black women's experience
.. "' Harris, supra note 14, at 588.
White feminist scholars do not completely ignore diversity among women. Catharine
MacKinnon, for example, acknowledges the experiences of women of color and recognizes that
feminist theory must take race into account. See, e.g., C. MACKINNON , FEMINISM UNrviODIFIED
2 (I987) ("[G]ender .
appears partly to comprise the meaning of, as well as bisect, race and
class, even as race and class specificities make up, as well as cross-cut, gender.").
20 Professor Harris defines gender essentialism as "the notion that a unitary, 'essential'
women's experience can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation,
and other realities of experience." Harris, supra note 14, at 585. She observes that this tendency
toward gender essentialism results in the silencing of the v erv same voices ignored by mainstream
legal jurisprudence - including the voices of women of color. See id. To claim the existence
of 2 monolithic , universal "woman's voice" is in fact to claim that the voice of white, heterosexual, socioeconomically privileged women can speak for all other women. See id. at 588; see
also E. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL \VOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT 4
(I g88) ("[T]he real problem has been how feminist theory has confused the condition of one
group of women with the condition of all."); Crenshaw, Denzarginalizing tlze Intersection of

Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Racist Politics, I989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. IJ9 , I52-6o (arguing that feminist theory has been
built only upon the experiences of white women).
21 See A. LORDE, 4ge, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference, in SISTER
OUTSIDER I 14, I 2 2 (I 984) ("Now we must recognize differences among women who are our
equals, neither inferior nor superior, and devise ways to see each others' difference to enrich
our visions and our joint struggles.''); Harris, supra note q , at 585-86; Kline, supra note r 7,
at I so ("(I]t is imperati\·e that white feminist legal theorists problematize and complicate our
analyses b y taking in to account the real and contradictor\· differences of interest and power
between women that are generated by, and generate, racism."); see also Cain, Feminist Jurisfnudenc e: Grounding the Theori es, 4 BERKELEY Wo~rE;-.;'s L.J. I9L 20-t-05 (rggol ("Good
feminist thought ought to reflec t the real differences in women's r ealities , in our lived experiences.
These include differences of race, class, age , physical a bility a nd sexual preference." (citation
omitted) )

- ·~;
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cutions to demonstrate the advantages of a discourse that combines
elements of racial equality and privacy theories in advocating the
reproductive rights of women of color.
Although women accused of prenatal crimes can present their
defenses only in court, judges are not the only government officials
charged with a duty to uphold the Constitution. 22 Given the Supreme
Court's current hostility to claims of substantive equality 23 and reproductive rights, 24 my arguments might be directed more fruitfully to
legislatures than to the courts. 25 Robin West, among others, has
22

The fourteenth amendment, for example, explicitly gives Congress the power to enforce
the equal protection clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § s.
23 See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762-63 (1989) (allowing white plaintiffs to
challenge affirmative action consent decrees on grounds of reverse discrimination); Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-5 2, 659-60 ( I989) (limiting the basis for establishing
a prima facie case of discrimination and shifting the burden of proving discrimination to
employees in title VII "disparate impact" actions); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, sos-o6 (I989) (striking down set-aside program for minority contractors as reverse
discrimination). But see Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, I IO S. Ct. 2 997, 3009 (I 990)
(upholding FCC policy designed to achieve more diverse programming by encouraging minority
ownership of broadcast licenses).
24 See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, I IO S. Ct. 2926, 2969-70 (I990) (upholding state statute
requiring notification of two parents before a minor may obtain an abortion unless she secures
a court order); ·webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 305 2 (I 989) (permitting
state restrictions on abortion, including a ban on the use of public facilities for performing some
abortions); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (r98o) (upholding version of Hyde /.mendment
that withheld federal Medicaid funds used to reimburse costs of abortion not necessary to save
the mother's life); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (I977) (permitting states to deny welfare
payments for nontherapeutic abortions).
25 Professor \Vest argues that "for both strategic and theoretical reasons, the proper audience
for the development of a progressive interpretation of the Constitution is Congress rather than
the courts." \Vest, Progressive and C onser-uative Constitutionalism, supra note 14, at 650
(emphasis in original). Alan Freeman has expressed a similar sentiment in more blunt terms:
"If the federal courts are to become, as they were in the past, little more than reactionary
apologists for the existing order, we should treat them with the contempt they deserve. One
can only hope that other political institutions will be reinvigorated." Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989, 64 TuL. L. REV. 1407, I44I (I990). I do not advocate
abandoning litigation as a st;·ategy for challenging government abuses. Rather, I am suggesting
the exploration of other forums for taking collective action to implement visions of a just society.
State courts and state constitutions may also provide a more progressive understanding of
equal protection and privacy rights. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv 489 (I977); Developments in the Law- The Interpretation
of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1442-43 (1982). State courts, for
example, have interpreted the right of teenagers to obtain an abortion without parental consent
more broadly under the state constitution's right of privacy than the Supreme Court has under
the federal Constitution. Com pare American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, 2 63 Cal.
Rptr. 46, 55 (Cal Ct. App. I989) (affirming the issuance of a preliminary injunction of law that
prohibited minors from obtaining abortions without parental consent or court order as violating
state constitutional right of privacy) and In re T. VI., SS 1 So. 2d II86, I 194 (Fla. 1989) (holding
that a Florida statute requiring minors to obtain parental consent or court order prior to
obtaining abortion violated the right of pri\·acy guaranteed by Florida's constitution ) with
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 1 ro S. Ct. 2926, 2969-70 (1990) (holding that a parental notif]cation
requirement \Vith judicially granted exception does not viotatc the Constitution).
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persuasively recharacterized the progressive interpretation of the constitutional guarantees of liberty and equality - such as the redistributive directive embodied in the fourteenth amendment 26 - as "political ideals to guide legislation, rather than as legal restraints on
legislation. "2 7
Legislatures may be more receptive than courts to the claim that
punitive policies contribute to the subordinate status of Black women.
They can serve as a forum for presenting both a vision of a community
free from racist standards of motherhood and as a means of collectively implementing that vision. This Article translates the dehumanization that Black women experience so that lawmakers may understand and reverse - or at least must confront - the injustice of the
prosecutions. 28
Part II of this Article presents background information about the
recent prosecutions of drug-addicted mothers and explains why most
of the defendants are poor and Black. Part III sets out the context
in which the prosecutions must be understood: the historical devaluation of Black women as mothers. I discuss three aspects of this
social phenomenon- the control of Black women's reproductive lives
during slavery, the abusive sterilization of Black women and other
women of color du~ing this century, and the disproportionate removal
of Black children from their families. I also describe how a popular
mythology denigrating Black motherhood has reinforced and legitimated this devaluation. Part IV characterizes the prosecutions as
punishing drug-addicted women for having babies . This approach
exposes the impact that the government's punitive policy has on the
devaluation of Black women as mothers. Part V argues that the
prosecutions violate the equal protection clause because they are
rooted in and perpetuate Black subordination . Part VI examines the
legal scholarship opposing state intervention in the lives of pregnant
women . I show that the typical arguments advanced against intervention are inadequate to explain or challenge the criminal charges
brought against drug-addicted mothers.
Finally, Part VII argues that punishing women for having babies
violates their constitutional right of privacy for two reason s: it violates
t he right of autonomy of women over their reproductiv e decisions,
and it creates an invidious government standard for child bearing. I
discuss two benefits of privacy doctrine for advoc ating the reproductive rights of women of color: its emphasis on the value of pe rsonhood,

S ee West, Progressive
!d . a t 717.
28 Professor Ba ll a rgues
visible , t heir world so that
tional academia. See Ball,
26

and C onse r·uative C ons titutionaii sm, sup ra note 14 , a t 7 I 5.

li

rSs s, r857 - 6o ( 1990).

th a t som e min ority sc ho lars are e ngaged in tr a nsla tin g, or m a kin g
t hey may influ enc e a nd eventu a ll y transfo rm the worl d of com·enTh e Legal A cademy and ivfin orit y Sch ola rs, ro 3 HA RV. L. RE v.
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and its protection against the abuse of government power. I argue,
however, that the liberal interpretation of privacy is inadequate to
eliminate the subordination of Black women. I therefore suggest that
a progressive understanding of priv_acy must acknowledge government's affirmative obligation to guarantee the rights of personhood
and must recognize the connection between the right of privacy and
racial equality.

II.

BACKGROUND: THE STATE'S PUNITIVE RESPONSE TO
DRUG-ADDICTED MOTHERS

A. The Crack Epidemic and the State's Response
Crack cocaine appeared in America in the early I g8os, and its
abuse has grown to epidemic proportions. 29 Crack is especially popular among inner-city women. 30 Indeed, evidence shows that, in
several urban areas in the United States, more women than men now
smoke crack. 31 Most crack-addicted women are of childbearing age,
and many are pregnant. 32 This phenomenon has contributed to an
explosion in the number of newborns affected by maternal drug use.
Some experts estimate that as many as 3 75 ,ooo drug-exposed infants
are born every year. 33 In many urban hospitals, the number of these
newborns has quadrupled in the last five years. 34 A widely cited I g88
study conducted by the National Association for Perinatal Addiction
Research and Education (NAPARE) found that eleven percent of
29

See Crack: A Disaster of Historic Dimension, Still Growing, N.Y. Times, May 28, I989,
§ 4, at q, col. r (editorial).
3 0 Approximately half of the nation's crack addicts are women.
See Alters, Women and
Crack: Equal Addiction, Unequal Care, Boston Globe, Nov. I, I989, at I, col. r. Some have
theorized that women arc attracted to crack because it can be smoked rather than injected. See
Teltsch, In Detroit, a Dn1g Recovery Center that 1-Velcomes the Pregnant Addict, N.Y. Times,

Mar. 20, 1990, at Aq, col. I. The highest concentrations of crack addicts are found in innercity neighborhoods. See Malcolm, Crack, Bane of Inner City, Is Now G,-ipping Suburbs, N.Y.
Times, Oct. I, I 989, 9 I, at I , col. r.
3! See Kolata, On Streets Ruled by Crack, Families Die, N.Y. Times, Aug. II, I989, at
AI3, col. 3·
32 Many crack-addicted women become pregnant as a result of trading sex for crack or
turning to prostitution to support their habit. See Alters, supra note 30, at I, col. I; Kolata,
supra note 6, at AI3, col. I. Crack seems t•J encourage sexual activity, in contrast to the
passivity induced by heroin addiction. See Alters, supra note 30, at I, col. I
33 See Besharov, Crack Babies: The Worst ThYCat Is l'v!om Herself, Wash. Post, Aug. 6,
I989, at B I, col. I. Approximately Io ,ooo to Ioo,ooo of these newborns are exposed to cocaine
or crack-cocaine. See Nolan, Protecting Fetuses from Prenatal Hazards: Whose C,-imes? What
Punishment?, 9 CRIM. JusT. ETHICS 13, I4 (I990).
34 The number of babies born to cocaine-addicted mothers in New York City, for example,
has more than quadrupled since r985. See 11fore Births to Cocaine Users, N.Y. Times, Apr.
7, 1990, at B3o, col. 2.
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newborns in thirty-six hospitals surveyed were affected by their mothers' illegal-drug use durin g pregnancy. 35 In several hospitals , the
proportion of drug-exposed infants was as high as fifteen and twentyfive percent. 36
Babies born to drug-addicted mothers may suffer a variety of
medical, developmental, and behavioral problems, depending on the
nature of their mother's substance abuse. Immediate effects of cocaine
exposure can include premature birth , 3 7 low birth weight, 38 and withdrawal symptoms. 3 9 Cocaine-exposed children have also exhibited
neurobehavioral problems such as mood dysfunction, organizational
deficits , poor attention, and impaired human interaction , although it
has
not
been
determined
whether
these
conditions
are
permanent. 4 0 Congenital disorders and deformities have also been
associated with cocaine use durin g pregnancy. 41 According to NAPARE, babies exposed to cocaine have a tenfold greater risk of sufferin g sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS). 42
Data on the extent and potential severity of the adverse effects of
maternal coc aine use are controversial. 43 The interpretation of studies
of cocaine-exposed infants is often clouded by the presence of other

35

See Davidson, Drug Bab ies Pu sh Issu e of Fetal Rights, L.A . Times, Apr. 25, 1989, pt.

1, at 3, col. 3·
.>6 See id.
37 See Chasnoff, Griffith, MacGrego r, Dir kes & Burn s, Temporal Patterns of Co caine Use
in Pregnancy: P eri natal Out come, 261 ]. A.M.A. 1741, I742 (1989); MacGregor, Keith , C hasnoff , Rosne r, C hisum , S h aw & M in ogue, Cocaine Use During Pregnancy: Adverse P erinatal
Outcome, 157 AM. ]. OB STETRICS & GYN. 686, 687 (r987); Neerhof, MacGregor, R etz ky &
Sulliv a n, Cowine Abus e D uring PYegnancy : P eripartum Pre-u alence and Perinatal Out come, r6r
AM. ]. OBSTETRICS & GYN. 63.3, 635 (1989) .
.lS S ee Petitti & Coleman, Cocain e and the Risk of Low B irth Weight , So AM . J. PuB.
HEALTH 25 , 25 (1990); K err , Crack Addictio n: The Tragic Toll on Women and The ir Childre n,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1987 , at B2, col. r.
39 See C hasnoff, Newbom I nfants <..:}ith Drug Withdrawal Symptoms, 9 PEDIATRICS REv.
273 (1988).
40 See Chasnoff. Cocain e, Pre gnancy and th e Neonat e, rs \VOMEN & H EALTH 23, 32-.B
(1989); Chasnoff, Burns , Schnall & Burns , Co caine Use in Pregnancy, 313 NEw EN G. ]. MED.
666 , 669 (1985); Howard , Cocaine and Its Effects on the Newborn, 31 DEV. MEo. & CH ILD
NEUROLOGY 255, 256 (1989).
41 See Chasnoff, Griffi th, MacGre gor, Dirkes & Burns, supra note 37, at 1743-44; Rev kin,
Crack in the Cradle, DISCOVER, Sept. 1989 , at 62, 63 ; Defects R epoYted in Babies of Cocaine
Usen, N.Y. Ti me s, Aug. 13, 1989, § r , at If , co l. r. But see Chasnoff, Peri natal Effects of
Cocaine , Co NT EMP. OBIGYN, May 1987, at 163, 176 ("Cocaine can not be linked to an in creased
inciden ce of congenital malformation s.") .
42 See Marcotte , supra note r o, at 14 ; see also Chasnoff, Burn s & Burns, Coca i ne Use in
Pregnancy: Perinatal1Vforbi dity and lvfortality , 9 NEUROTOXICOLOGY & TE RATOLOGY 29 1, 292
(1987) (find ing 15 % incidenc e of SIDS in cocaine-e xposed infants).
43 S ee Koren , Graham , S hear & E in a rso n , Bias Against the Null H ypothesis: Th e Reproductive Hazards of Cocaine , LANCET, Dec. r 6, 1989 , at 1440, 1440; Blakeslee , Chi ld-R earing
Is Stonny w h en Dmgs Cl oud Birth, N.Y. Ti m es , l'>'lay rg, 1990, § r , at r, col. 3 ·
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fetal risk factors, such as the mother's use of additional drugs, cigarettes, and alcohol and her socioeconomic status. 44 For example, the
health prospects of an infant are significantly threatened because pregnant addicts often receive little or no prenatal care and may be
malnourished. 45 Moreover, because the medical community has given
more attention to studies showing adverse effects of cocaine exposure
than to those that deny these effects, the public has a distorted perception of the risks of maternal cocaine use. 46 Researchers have not
yet authoritatively determined the percentage of infants exposed to
cocaine who actually experience adverse consequences. 47
The response of state prosecutors, legislators, and judges to the
problem of drug-exposed babies has been punitive. They have punished women who use drugs during pregnancy by depriving these
mothers of custody of their children, by jailing them during their
pregnancy, and by prosecuting them after their babies are born.
The most common penalty for a mother's prenatal drug use is the
permanent or temporary removal of her baby. 48 Hospitals in a number of states now screen newborns for evidence of drugs in their urine
and report positive results to child welfare authorities. 49 Some child
protection agencies institute neglect proceedings to obtain custody of
babies with positive toxicciogies based solely on these tests. 50 lVIore

44

See Koren, Graham, Shear & Einarson, supra note 43, at I44I.
See Poland, Ager & Olson, Barrien to Receiving Adequate Prenatal Ca-re, 157 AM. ].
OBSTETRICS & GYN. 297, 300 (r987); Ryan, Ehrlich & Finnegan, Cocaine Abuse in Pregnancy:
Effects on the Fetus and Newborn, 9 NEUROTOXICOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 295, 298 (1987). A
Northwestern University study of pregnant cocaine addicts found that comprehensive prenatal
care may improve the outcome of pregnancies complicated by coca.ine abuse. See MacGregor,
Keith, Bachicha & Chasnoff, Cocaine Abuse During Pregnancy: Correlation Between Prenatal
Care and Perinatal Outcome, 74 OBSTETRICS & GYN. 882, 885 (1989).
46 See Koren, Graham, Shear & Einarson, supra note 43, at I440-41.
4 7 See Nolan, supra note 33, at I4.
48 See Sherman, Keeping Babies Free of Drugs, NAT'L L.]., Oct. 16, 1989 , at r, col. 4;
Gorman, Involuntary Drug Testing of New 1Vf.others Gives Birth to Legal Debate, L.A. Times,
Apr. 14, 1988, pt. 2, at I, col. I.
49 Several states have enacted statutes that require the reporting of positive newborn toxi cologies to state authorities. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. II9, § SIA (Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 6z6.556(2)(c) (West Supp. I99I); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (West Supp. 1991);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-504 (1989). Many hospitals also interpret state child abuse reporting
laws to require them to report positive results. For a discussion of the constitutional and ethical
issues raised by the drug screening of postpartum women and newborns, see Moss, Legal Issues:
Drug Testing of Postpartum Women and Newborns as the Basis for Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1406, 1409-13 (1990); Moss, supra note 2, at 292-96.
so See Moss, supra note 2, at 28g-go; Sherman, supra note 48, at 28, col. 4; Besharov , supra
note 33, at B4 , col. 2.
Several states have facilitated this process by expanding the statutory definition of neglected
children to include infants who test positive for controlled substances at birth. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 415.503(9)(A)(2) (West Supp. 1991 ); Ill. Juvenile Ct. Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, para.
802-3, ~ 2-3 (1)(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); IND. CoDE ANN. § 31-6-4-3. 1(r)(b) (West Supp.
45
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and more government authorities are also removing drug-exposed
newborns from their mothers immediately after birth pending an investigation of parental fitness. 51 In these investigations, positive neonatal toxicologies often raise a strong presumption of parental unfitness,52 which circumvents the inquiry into the mother's ability to care
for her child that 1s customarily necessary to deprive a parent of
custody. 53
A second form of punishment is the "protective" incarceration of
pregnant drug addicts charged with unrelated crimes. In rg88, a
Washington, D.C. judge sentenced a thirty-year-old woman named
Brenda Vaughn, who pleaded guilty to forging $700 worth of checks,
to jail for the duration of her pregnancy. 54 The judge stated at
sentencing that he wanted to ensure that the baby would be born in
jail to protect it from its mother's drug abuse. 55 Although the Vaughn
case has received the most attention, anecdotal evidence suggests that
defendants' drug use during pregnancy often affects judges' sentencing
decisions. 56
Finally, women have been prosecuted after the birth of their children for having exposed the fetuses to drugs or alcohol. 57 Creative

I990); MASS . GEN. L. ch. II9, § 5IA (Supp. I990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.330(!)(b)
(Mi chie 199 1); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § uor(4)(c) (West Supp. 1991).
5 I See No te , The Problem of the Dru g-E xposed Newborn: A Return to Prin cipled In terven -

tio n , 4 2 STAN. L. REv. 745 , 749, 752 & n 25 (1990).
52 See, e .g. , In re Stefanel T yes ha C., 157 A.D.2d 322 , 325 -2 6 , 556 N.Y.S.2d 280 , 282 -83
(N .Y App. Di v . 1990) , appeal d is misse d , 76 N.Y.2 d roo6 (1990) (holdin g that a llegatio ns of a
pos iti ve infa nt toxicology, alon g with th e mother 's admitted dru g use during pre g nan cy and
fa ilure to e nroll in a drug rehabilitation program, constituted a cause of action for negle c t); In
re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. III, II6 , 293 N. W .2 d 736, 739 (1980) (holding that a drug-exp osed
newborn "may properly be con sid ered a neglec ted child within the jurisdi ction of the probate
court"). For a critical analysis of th e pres umption of parental unfitne ss , see Note, supra note
S I , a t 755-58.
5.1 See Sa nto sky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768 (1982) (holding that proof of neglect by clear
and co nvin cin g evidence is co nstitutiona ll y required before state may te rminate parental ri g hts).
For a ge ne ra l description and cr itiqu e of state ne g lect statutes, see \Vald , State In terventio;1. on
B ehalf of "Neglec ted" Chi ldren: Standards for Remov al of Children from Their Ho m es, lv! oniloring th e Status of Children in Foste r Care, and Terminati on of Parental R ights, 28 STAN . L
REV. 623 , 628-35, 643-48, 665 - 72 (19 76).
54 See U nited States v. Vau g hn , C ri m. No. F 2 r 7 2-88 B (D. C. Supe r. Ct. Aug. 2 3, 1988);
M oss, Pregnant! Go Dire ctly to Jail , A .B. A.. J., Nov. I , 1988, at 20; Co hen, When a F etu s
Has Mor e Rights than llze M oth er, Wash. Post, July 28, 1988, at A2r, co l. I; see also Cox v
Court, 4 2 Ohio App. 3d J7I, 17 3 , 53 7 N.E.2 d 721, 723 (I988) (revers in g juvenile court orde r
placing a pre gnant woman in a "sec ur e drug fac ility" to protec t the fetus from the woman's
cocain e u se) .
55 A t Vau ghn's sentencing, Jud ge P e ter Wolf stated: "I'm going to keep her locked up un t il
the ba by is born because sh e's te sted pos it ive for cocaine w he n s he ca me befo re m e .
She's
app a re ntly a n a ddicti ve personal ity. a nd I'll be darned if l';n goi n g to have a baby born th at
w ay. " Moss, supra note 54, at 20.
56 See D av idson , supm note 35, a t 19, co!. 1.
s; See supra notes 2 & 5·
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statutory interpretations that once seemed little more than the outlandish concoctions of conservative scholars 58 are now used to punish
women. Mothers of children affected by prenatal substance abuse
have been charged with crimes such as distributing drugs to a minor,
child abuse and neglect, manslaughter, and assault with a deadly
weapon.
This Article considers the constitutional implications of criminal
prosecution of drug-addicted mothers because, as Part IV explains,
this penalty most directly pumshes poor Black women for having
babies. When the government prosecutes, its intervention is not designed to protect babies from the irresponsible actions of their mothers
(as is arguably the case when the state takes custody of a pregnant
addict or her child). Rather, the government criminalizes the mother
as a consequence of her decision to bear a child.

B. The Disproportionate Impact on Poor Black Women
Poor Black women bear the brunt of prosecutors' punitive approach. 59 These women are the primary targets of prosecutors, not
because they are more likely to be guilty of fetal abuse, but because
they are Black and poor. Poor women, who are disproportionately
Black, 60 are in closer contact with government agencies, and their
drug use is therefore more likely to be detected. Black women are
also more likely to be reported to government authorities, in part
because of the racist attitudes of health care professionals. 61 Fidally,
their failure to meet society's image of the ideal mother makes their
prosecution more acceptable.
To charge drug-addicted mothers with crimes, the state must be
able to identify those who use drugs during pregnancy. Because poor
women are generally under greater government supervision- through
their associations with public hospitals, welfare agencies, and probation officers - their drug use is more likely to be detected and
reported. 62 Hospital screening practices result in disproportionate re53 See, e.g., Parness, The Duty to Prn•ent Handicaps: Laws Pmmoting the Prevention of
Handicaps to Newborns, 5 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 431, 442~52 (1983); Parness & Pritchard,
supra note r 3, at 2 70 (advocating that states "promote the unborn's potentiality for life by
outlawing fetus endangerment, abandonment, neglect and nonsupport") (citations omitted).
59 See supra note 6.
60 Black women are five times more likely to live in poverty, five times more likely to be on
welfare , and three times more likely to be unemployed than are white women. See UNITED
STATES CoM~!'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF BLACK WOME:--1 I (1990).
6 1 See infra notes 70~78 and accompanying text.
62 See McNulty, supra note 8, at 319; see also Faller & Ziefert, Causes of Child Abuse and
Negle ct, in SOCIAL WORK WITH ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN 32, 46~47 (K. Faller ed.
I 98 I) (providing a similar explanation of why poor parents are more likely to be reported for
child neglect).
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porting of poor Black women. 63 The government's main source of
information about prenatal drug use is hospitals' reporting of positive
infant toxicologies to child welfare authorities. Hospitals serving poor
minority communities implement this testing almost exclusively. 6 4 Private physicians w ho serve more affluent women perform less of this
screening both because they have a financial stake both in retaining
their patients' business and securing referrals from them and because
they are socially more like their patients. 65
Hospitals administer drug tests in a manner that further disc riminates against poor Black women . One common criterion triggering
an infant toxicology screen is the mother's failure to obtain prenatal
care, 66 a factor that correlates strongly with race and income. 6 7 Worse
still, many hospitals have no formal screening procedures, relying
solely on the suspicions of health care professionals. 68 This discretion
allows doctors and hospital staff to perform tests based on their stereotyped assumptions about drug addicts. 6 9
Health care profession a ls are much more likely to report Black
women's drug use to government authorities than they are similar
drug use by their wealthy white patients. 70 A study recently reported
in The New England J ou·rnal of Me di cine demonstrated this racial
bias in the reporting of maternal drug use . 71 Researchers studied the
results of toxicolo gic tests of pre gnant women who received prenatal
care in public health clinics and in private obstetrical offices in Pinellas
County, Florida. 72 Little difference existed in the prevalence of substance abu se by pregnant women alon g either racial or economic

See Note, supra note SI , at 753, 782 n. IS?; Kalata, supra note 3 I , at AI,3, col. ,3.
See No te, supra no te 5 I, at 753·
65 See Chas noff, Lan dress & Barre tt, Tlze Pre-l'alence of llli cit-Dmg or ,Ilcolzol Use Dzning
Pregnancy an d Discrepan cies in 1'vfandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEW
E NG. J. MED. 1202 , 1205 (ta bl e 3) ( 1990); Angel, Addicted Babies : L egal System's R esponse
UncleaY, L.A. Daily ]. , Feb. 29 , 1988, at r, col. 6.
66 See Note, supm note 5 r, at 75.3, 798-99.
6 7 See Moss, su pm note 49 , at qr2; infm notes 14.3- 146 and acco mpan ying text.
68 See N ote, supra note 51, at 75.3·
69 See Chasnoff, Landress & Barrett, supya note 65, at I 206 ; Note, sup ra note 5 I, a t 754 &
n. ,36; see also Faller & Zicfert, supm note 62, at 47 (noting th at professionals a re m ore likely
to repo rt chil d ab use by poo r parents because of their disbelief in abuse by th eir ow n socioeconomi c class).
70 See Note, supra note 51 , at 754 & n. 36; C hasnoff, Landress & Barrett, supra note 65 , at
!2 05.
7 1 See C has noff , La nd ress , & Barrett, supra note 65, a t 1205 (tab le 3).
72 See id. at 1203. The resear chers tested urine samples from 715 pregna nt wo men who
enroll ed for prenatal care in th e co unty durin g a on e-mo nth period. Three hund red eighty
wo men a t fi ve public health clinics and 33 5 wome n a t 1 2 pr ivate obstetrical offices we re scree ned
for alcoho l, opia tes, cocaine a nd its metabolites, an d cann ab in oi ds be tween J an uary r an d Jun e
30 , 1989 .
63
64
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lines, 73 nor was there any significant difference between public clinics
and private offices. 74 Despite similar rates of substance abuse, however, Black women were ten times more likely than whites to be
reported to public health authorities 75 for substance abuse during
pregnancy. 76 Although several possible explanations can account for
this disparate reporting, 7i both public health facilities and private
doctors are more inclined to turn in pregnant Black women who use
drugs than pregnant white women who use drugs. 78
It is also significant that, out of the universe of maternal conduct
that can injure a fetus, 79 prosecutors have focused on crack use. The
selection of crack addiction for punishment can be justified neither by
the number of addicts nor the extent of the harm to the fetus. Excessive alcohol consumption during pregnancy, for example, can cause
severe fetal injury, so and marijuana use may also adversely affect the

73 See id. at 1204. The ra te of positive res ults on toxicologic testing for white women
(15-4%) was sli ghtl y hi gher th a n that for Bl ack women (q. I %) . See id. at 1204 (table 2).
7 4 "The fr eq uen cy of a positive result was I 6.3% for women seen a t the public clinics a nd
13.1 % for women seen at the private office s." !d. at 1203 (table r).
75 In March 1987, the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilita tiv e Services ado pted a
policy re qu iring hosp itals to report to local health departments evidence of drug and alc ohol use
during preg nancy. Se e id. at 1202- 03.
76 See id. at I 204.
77 The authors of the Pinellas Co unty study sug gest several reasons for th e disc rep a ncy in
reporting. Phys icia ns may have been prompted to test Black women and their infants more
frequentl y because the infan ts displayed more seve re symptoms or because Black women intoxicated fr om sm oking crack are m ore readil y identified than white women intoxicated from
s moking marijuan a . Se e id . at r 205. Additionally, th e disproportionate rep ort in g of Bl ac k
wo me n may res ult from socioeco no mic factors a nd the mistaken preconception th a t substance
ab use during pregnan cy is predominantly an inner-city, minority group problem. S ee id. at
1206. The second explanation does not negate the racist na ture of the rate of reporting a nd
subseq uen t prosec uti on of women who use drugs during pregnancy, however. Even if physicians
do not consciously de cide to report Black women rather than white women, their testing a nd
reporting practices unjustifiably disc riminate against Black women and thu s d e monstrate their
unconscious racism. See Lawrence , Th e I d, th e E go, and Equal PYotectio n: Re ck oning wi th
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 316, 3 28-44 (r987).
78 The striking de gree of differe nce between the reporti ng rate of drug use by Black women
and that of white wome n a nd the s imil arity in their rates of substanc e abuse stron gly sugg es ts
that raci a l prejudice and stereotyping must be a factor.
79 Numero us maternal ac ti vities are poten tiall y harmful to th e devel o pin g fetus, in cluding
dr inking a lcoh oL takin g prescription and nonprescription dru gs, smoking cigarettes, fa iling to
eat properly, a nd residin g at high altitud es for prolonged periods. S ee, e.g., I NSTITUTE OF
MED., PR EVENT ING LOW BIRTHWEIGHT 65 - 72 ( t985); Berkowitz, Holford & Berkowitz, Effec ts
of Cigarette S moking, Alco hol, Coffee and Tea Consumption on Pretenn DeliveYy. i EARLY
Hl.'M. DEv. 23 9 (198 2) ; Note, PaYental Liability for Prenatal lnjzlYy, I4 CO LUlvl. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 4 7, 73-75 (197 8) . Co nd uct by people other than the pregn a nt woman ca n a lso thre a ten
the health of the fetu s. A pregnant woman 's exposure to secondary cigarett e sm oke, sexually
transmitted and other infec tious di se ases, en viro nm ental ha.zards such as radiati o n an d lead ,
a nd physical a bu se can harm the fe tus. See CH IL DREN's D EFE NS E FuND , THE HEALTH OF
A'>IE RICA' S CHILDREN 35-3 7 (1989) ; N ote, supYa no te 8, at 6o6-o;.
so I nfants born to mothers who drink heav il y during pregnancy may suffer from fet a l a lc o hol
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unborn. 81 The incidence of both these types of substance abuse is
high as well. 82 In addition, prosecutors do not always base their claims
on actual harm to the child, but on the mere delivery of crack by the
mother. 8 3 Although different forms of substance abuse prevail among
pregnant women of various socioeconomic levels and racial and ethnic
backgrounds, 84 inner-city Black communities have the highest concentrations of crack addicts. 85 Therefore, selecting crack abuse as the
primary fetal harm to be punished has a discriminatory impact that
cannot be medically justified.
Focusing on Black crack addicts rather than on other perpetrators
of fetal harms serves two broader social purposes. 86 First, prosecution
of these pregnant women serves to degrade women whom society

syndrome, characterized by physical malformations, small head and body size, poor mental
capabilities, and abnormal behavior patterns, including mental retardation. See Clarren &
Smith, The Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. I063 (I9i8); Ouellette, Rosett,
Rosman & Weiner, Adverse Effects on Offspring of M atemal Alcohol Abuse During Pregnancy,
297 NEW ENG. J. MED. 528 (I9i7l- Some experts believe that prenatal alcohol exposure is the
most common known cause of mental retardation in this country. See Rosenthal, When a
Pregnant Woman Drinks, N.Y. Times , Feb. 4 , I990, § 6 (Magazine), at 30.
sr Marijuana use during pregnancy has been associated with impaired fetal development and
reduced gestational length. See, e.g., Fried, Watkinson & Willan, Marijuana Use During
Pregnancy and Decreased Length of Gestation, ISO AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYN. 23 (I984);
Zuckerman, Frank, Hingson, Amaro, Levenson, Kayne, Parker, Vinci, Aboagye, Fried, Cabral,
Timperi & Bauchner, Effects of Matemal Mm·ijuana and Cocaine Use on Fetal Growth , 320
NEW ENG. J. MED. 762 (I989) [hereinafter Effects of Maternal i'vfarijuana].
8 2 Approximately 6ooo to 8ooo newborns each year suffer from fetal alcohol syndrome. See
Nolan, supra note 33, at IS. An additional 35,ooo infants experience less severe effects of
maternal drinking. See Doctors Criticized on Fetal Problem, N.Y. Times, Dec. I I, I 990, at
Bro, col. 6. A study of 2200 women who gave birth at the University of vVashington Hospital
in Seattle from March I989 to March 1990 and who used drugs during or immediately before
pregnancy revealed that 20% smoked marijuana, I6% used cocaine, and 9% used either heroin,
methadone, or amphetamines. See Blakeslee, Parents Fight for a Future for Infants Born to
Dmgs , N.Y. Times, May I9, I99D, at Ar, col. 3; see also Effects of Aiaternal AlaYijuana, supra
note 81, at 762 (noting that in I 985 , 3 I% of American women in their late teens and early
twenties reported using marijuana within the past year).
83 See State Case Summary, supra note 2; infra note 260.
8 " See Chasnoff, Landress & Barrett, supra note 65, at I2o4; Malcolm, supra note 30, at r,
col. I. A I 989 study of 22 78 highly educated women found that 30% consumed more than one
drink per week while pregnant. See Rosenthal, supra note So, at 49· Furthermore, despite the
media's depiction of crack addiction as an exclusively inner-city problem, crack use among
middle-class and affluent people is on the rise. See Elmer-DeWitt, A Plague Without Boundaries: Cmck, Once a ProbLem of the Poor, Iwuades the 111iddle Class, TIME, Nov. 6, I989. at
97; Malcolm, supm note 30, at 1, col. 1.
S.i See Malcolm. supm note 30, at I, col. I. The Pinellas County study, for example, found
that Black women tested positive more frequently· for cocaine use during pregnancy ( 7. 5% versus
r.8% for white women), whereas white women tested positive more frequently for the use of
marijuana (14-4':/c versus 6.o% for Black women). See Chasnoff, Landress &: Barrett, supra
note 65, at. I2D4 (table 2).
86 See Roberts. The Bias in Drug A1-rests of Pregnant Women, N.Y. Times, Aug. I r, I990,
at 2 s, col. 2.
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views as undeserving to be mothers and to discourage them from
having children. If prosecutors had instead chosen to prosecute affluent women addicted to alcohol or prescription medication, the policy
of criminalizing prenatal conduct very likely would have suffered a
hasty demise. Society is much more willing to condone the punishment of poor women of color who fail to meet the middle-class ideal
of motherhood.
In addition to legitimizing fetal rights enforcement, the prosecution
of crack-addicted mothers diverts public attention from social ills such
as poverty, racism, and a misguided national health policy and implies
instead that shamefully high Black infant death rates 87 are caused by
the bad acts of individual mothers. Poor Black mothers thus become
the scapegoats for the causes of the Black community's ill health.
Punishing them assuages any guilt the nation might feel at the plight
of an underclass with infant mortality at rates higher than those in
some less developed countries. 88 Making criminals of Black mothers
apparently helps to relieve the nation of the burden of creating a
health care system that ensures healthy babies for all its citizens. 89
For a variety of reasons, then, an informed appraisal of the competing interests involved in the prosecutions must take account of the
race of the women affected. Part III examines a significant aspect of
Black women's experience that underlies the punishment of crackaddicted mothers.

III.

THE DEVALUATION OF BLACK MOTHERHOOD

The systematic, institutionalized denial of reproductive freedom
has uniquely marked Black women's history in America. An important part of this denial has been the devaluation of Black women as
mothers. A popular mythology that degrades Black women and portrays them as less deserving of motherhood reinforces this subordi~~ In I 987, the mortality rate for Black infants was 17.9 deaths per 1000, compared to a
rate of 8.6 deaths per 1000 for white infants. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U:--i!TED STATES 77 (table I ro) ( 1990).
ss In Ig86, the Black infant mortality rate (I8 death:; per 1000 live births) was higher than
the infant mortality rate in Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Cuba, and Singapore. See CHILDREN'S
DEFENSE Fu:--~D, supra note 79, at q (table I.8) (1989). A Black infant born in the inner city
has an c\"Cn greater chance of dying before reaching his first birthciay. See id. at 23 (table
I .10)
89 Descriptions of the degeneracy and disintegration of the Black family have played a similar
role in explaining poverty, crime, and unemployment in the Black community. The selfdestructiveness of Blacks is often blamed for their predicament rather than racism. See Gresham, The Politics of Family in America, NATION, July 2-tiJI, rg8g, at I r6, I r 7-rg (discussing
how the Moynihan Report on the Black family and the CBS Special Report, Tlze Vanishing
Black Family- Crisis in Blark America, made the Black familv the scapegoat for the condition
of Black America!.
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nation. This mythology is one aspect of a complex set of images that
deny Black humanity in order to rationalize the oppression of
Blacks. 90
In this Part, I will discuss three manifestations of the devaluation
of Black motherhood: the original exploitation of Black women durin g
slavery, the more contemporary, disproportionate removal of Black
children from their mothers' custody, and ste rilization abuse.
Throughout this Part, I will also show how several popular images
denigrating Black mothers - the licentious Jeze bel, the careless, incompetent mother, the domineering matriarch , and the lazy welfare
mother - have reinforced and legitimated their devaluation.
A. Th e Slavery Experienc e
Th e essence of Black women's experience durin g slavery was the
brutal denial of autonomy ove r reproduction. Female slaves were
commercially valuable to their masters not only for their labor, but
also for their capacity to produce more slaves. 9 1 Henry Louis Gates,
Jr., writing about the a utob iography of a slave named Harriet A.
Jacob s, observes that it "charts in vivid detail precisely how the shape
of her life and the choices she makes are defined by her reduction to
a sexual object, an object to be raped, bred or ab used. "92 Black
women's childbearing during slavery was thu s largely a product of
oppression rather than an expression of self-definition and personhood.
90 See, e.g., id. a t I 20 (d escribi n g th e dom in an t soc iety's resista n ce to th e co n cept o f Bl ac k
people as "vulnerable human beings") . F or a disc u ssion of th e h egemo ni c functio n of racist
ideology , see Crens haw , supra not e 14, at IJ70 - 8r ( I988). See genemlly G. FREDRICKSON, THE
BLACK IM AGE IN THE WHIT E MIND 2 56-8 2 ( I 97 I) (discussin g the propagat ion of theorie s of
Blac k infer io rity and degeneracy a t th e turn of the century); J. WILLIAM SO N, THE CRuCIBLE
OF RACE: BLACK- \VHITE RELATIO NS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE EMANCIPATION I I 1-5 I
(1984) (d iscuss in g t he prevalen ce of theories near the turn of the century that B lacks, freed from
slavery, were returning to their "natural state of bestiality").
91 See A. DAVIS, WOMEN , RACE, AND CLASS 7 ( I 98I); J. }O NES , LABOR OF LOVE , L ABOR
OF SORROW: BLACK WOME N, WORK AND THE fAMIL Y FROl\1 S LAVERY TO THE PRESENT 12
( I985). Legislatio n g iv in g t h e ch ild ren of B lac k women a nd white men t h e s tatus of slaH s left
fema le s laves v uln erab le to se xu a l v iol atio n as a m ea n s of financ ia l ga in . See P. GIDDING S,
WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: TH E I MPACT OF BLACK WOME N Qt.; RACE Al'>D SEX IN ArvtERICA
37 (1984). For a discussion of s u c h laws in Virginia and Georgia, see A. HIGG INBOTHAM, I N
TH E MATTER OF COLOR 42 -45, 252 (1978).
White masters controlled th eir s lav es' rep roductive capacity by rewa rding pregnancy with
relief from wo rk in the field and add iti o n s of clot hing and food, puni s hin g slave women who
d id not give birth , manipulatin g sla\·c marital choices, forcing th em to breed, and raping th em.

See J. } ONES , supra, at 34- .)S; WE ARE YOUR SISTERS : BLACK WOM EN IN THE N INETEE NTH
CENTURY 24-26 (D. S te rlin g eel. I984l; C li nto n , Caught in the W eb of the Big House: Women

and Slavery, in THE WEB OF SOUTHERN SoCI.-'I.L REL\TI O!'>S 19, 23-28 (\V. Ra se r, R. Sa und e rs
& J. Wake lyn eels . I 985 l
n Gates, T o be Rape d, Bred m· ...J.buscd, N.Y. TB tES Boor..: REv. , No\·. 22 , r9 87, at 12
(reviewi n g H. }.-'\COBS, I:--; cmENTS IN T HE LIFE OF.-\ SLAVE GIRL (j Yellin ed. 1987)) .
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The method of whipping pregnant slaves that was used throughout
the South vividly illustrates the slaveowners' dual interest in Black
women as both workers and childbearers. Slaveowners forced women
to lie face down in a depression in the ground while they were
w hipped. 93 This procedure allowed the masters to protect the fetus
while abusing the mother. It serves as a powerful metaphor for the
evils of a fetal protection policy that denies the humanity of the
mother. It is also a forceful symbol of the convergent oppressions
inflicted on slave women: they were subjugated at once both as Blacks
and as females.
From slavery on, Black women have fallen outside the scope of
the American ideal of womanhood. 94 Slave owners forced slave
women to perform strenuous labor that contradicted the Victorian
female roles prevalent in the dominant white society. Angela Davis
has observed: "judged by the evolving nineteenth-century ideology of
femininity, which emphasized women's roles as nurturing mothers and
gentle companions and housekeepers for their husbands, Black women
were practically anomalies. "95 Black women's historical deviation
from traditional female roles has engendered a mythology that denies
their womanhood.
One of the most prevalent images of slave women was the character of Jezebel, a woman governed by her sexual desires. 9 6 As early
as I7 36, the South Carolina Gazette described "African Ladies" as
women "of 'strong robust constitution' who were 'not easily jaded out'
but able to serve their lovers 'by Night as well as Day. "' 97 This
ideological construct of the licentious J ezebel legitimated white men's
sexual abuse of Black women. 98 The stereotype of Black women as
sexually promiscuous helped to perpetuate their devaluation as mothers.
The myth of the "bad" Black woman was deliberately and systematically perpetuated after slavery ended. 99 For example, historian
See J. }ONES, supra note 91, at w; Johnson, supra note r, at 513.
See A. DAVIS, supra note 91, at s; D. \VHITE, AR'N'T I A \VOMAN? FEMALE SLAVES IN
THE PLANTATION SOUTH r6, 27-29 (1985). For a description of gender conventions in the
plantation South, see E. FOX- GENOVESE, \VITHIN THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD 192-241
93

94

(1988).
Kimberle Crenshaw describes how racist ideology reflects an "oppositional dynamic, premised
upon maintaining Blacks as an excluded and subordinated 'other."' Crenshaw, supra note q,
at 1381. Under this pattern of oppositional categories, whites are associated with positive
characteristic s (industrious, intelligent, responsible); Blacks are associated with the opposite,
aberrational qualities (lazy, ignorant, shiftless). See id. at I .3 70-71 & n. I 5 I.
95 A. DAVIS, supra note 9I , at;.
96 See D. \VHITE, supra note 94, at 28-29
97 !d. at 30.
o;; See E. Fox-GENOVESE , sufna note 94, at 292; D. \VHITE, supra note 94, at 6r.
99 See BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AIIIERICA 163-71 (G. Lerner ed. 1973); P. GIDDINGS,
su,tTri note gr. at 85-89; B. HooKs. mpra note I/, at ss-6o.
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Philip A. Bruce's book, The Plantation Negro as a Freeman, published
in r88g, strengthened popular views of both Black male and Black
female degeneracy. 100 Bruce traced the alleged propensity of the Black
man to rape white women to the "wantonness of the women of his
own race " and "the sexual laxness of plantation women as a class . " 10 1
This image of the sexually loose, impure Black woman that originated
in slavery persists in modern American culture. 10 2
Black women during slavery were also systematically denied the
rights of motherhood. Slave mothers had no legal claim to their
children. 103 Slave masters owned not only Black women, but also
their children. They alienated slave women from their children by
selling them to other slaveowners and by controlling childrearing. 10 4
In r85 r , Sojourner Truth reminded the audience at a women's rights
convention that society denied Black women even the limited dignity
of Victorian womanhood accorded white women of the time, including
the right of mothering:
Dat man ober dar say dat women needs to be helped into carriages,
and lifted ober ditches, and to have de best place every whar. Nobody
eber help me into carriages, or ober mud puddles, or gives me any
best place . .. and ar'n't I a woman? Look at me! Look at my arm'
. . . I have plowed, and planted , and gathered into barns, and no
man co uld head me - and ar'n't I a woman? I could work as much
and eat as much as a man (when I could get it), and bear de lash as
well - and ar'n't I a woman? I have borne thirteen chilern and seen
em mos' all sold off into slavery, and when I cried out with a mother's
grief, none but Jesus heard - and ar'n't I a woman ?lOS

Black women struggled in many ways to resist the efforts of slave
masters to control their reproductive lives. They used contraceptives
and abortives, escaped from plantations, feigned illness, endured severe punishment, and fought back rather than submit to slave masters'
sexual domination. 106 Free Black women with the means to do so

IOO

See Gres ham , supra n ote 89 , at r 1 7.

P. BRUCE, THE PLANTATION NEGRO AS A fREEMAN 84-8 5 (r88g).
See B. HOOKS, supra note 17, at 65 - 68; Omolade , Black Women, Black lvlen and Tawana
Braw ley: The Shared Condition, 12 H ARV. Wm.rE N's L.J. 12, r6 (1989).
10 3 See Allen, Sun·ogacy, Slavery, and the Owners/z ip of Life, 13 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y
IOI

10 2

139, 140 n .9 (1990). Professor Allen tell s the story of Polly, a woman wrongfully held in slavery,
w ho successfull y s ued a white man in 1842 for th e return of he r daughter Lu cy. Poll y u sed
slave law to prove unlawful possession. She argued that, because she was not in fact a slave
at the tim e of Lucy's birth, she was th e rightful owner of her daughter. See id. a t 142-44.
I04 Se e id. a t 140 n.9; Burnham , Children of the Slave Community in the Unit ed States, 19
fREEDOMWAYS 75, 75-77 (1979).
105 0. GILBERT, NARRATIVE OF SOJOURNER TRUTH 133 (1878) .
106 Se eP. GIDDINGS , supra note 91, a t 46; WE ARE YouR SISTERS, supra note 91, at 25 26, 58-61; D . WHITE, su pra note 94, at 76- 90.
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purchased freedom for their daughters and sisters . 107 Black women,
along with Black men, succeeded remarkably often in maintaining the
integrity of their family life despite slavery's disrupting effects. 108

B. The Disproportionate Removal of Black Children
The disproportionate number of Black mothers who lose custody
of their children through the child welfare system is a contemporary
manifestation of the devaluation of Black motherhood. 10 9 This disparate impact of state intervention results in part from Black families '
higher rate of reliance on government welfare. 11 0 Because welfare
familie s are subject to supervision by social workers, instances of
perceived neglect are more likely to be reported to governmental

107 See BLACK W o ME N IN WHI TE AMERICA, supra note 99 , a t 40-42.
This prac ti ce is
poigna ntl y d escribed in the wo rd s of a former slave nam ed Anna Juli a Cooper in a speec h given
m I 893 to the Congress of R ep resenta ti ve Wom en :
Yet a ll throu gh th e dark es t period of the colored women 's oppression in this co untry h er
yet un wr itten hi sto r y is full of heroi c struggle , a struggle again st fearful and ove rwhelmin g
odd s, th a t ofte n e nded in horribl e d eath , to maintain a nd protec t that w hi ch wom a n
hol ds dearer th a n life. The painful , patien t, a nd sil en t toil of mothers to gain a fee
sim p le title to th e bodies of their daughters , the de sp a iring fi ght , as of a n entrap ped
ti gress, to ke ep h a llo w ed t h eir o w n p ersons, wo uld furni sh materia l for ep ics .

BLACK W OM EN IN N INETE EN TH-CE NTU RY AM ERI CAN LIF E 32 9 (B . Loewenberg & R. B ogin
ed s . I 976) .
108 See ge nerally H. G UT MAN, TH E BLACK FA MILY IN SLAVERY AN D FREEDO M, 17 90-19 25
( I 976) (d esc ribin g t he life of th e Black fa mil y durin g slave ry); J ones, "!V! y iv! othe1· Wa s Jv!uch of
a Woman": B lack Wom en , Work, and the Fam ily Under Slavery , 8 F E!\!I NIST STUD. 235, 252 6 I (r982 ) (describin g the sex ua l divisio n of labor initiated by slaves within th eir own co mmunities).
10 9 See G ray & Ny bell , I ssues in Af rican-American Fa mily Preservatio n , 69 C HILD \VELFA RE
5 r 3, 51 3 (199 0) (noting th a t abo ut h a lf of the chil d ren in fos ter care a re Black ); Hog a n & Sin,
Minorit y Children and the Chi ld Welfare Syst em : An Hi storical Perspect ic'e, 33 Soc. W ORK 493
(1988). O nce Bl ac k children e nter fo ste r care , th ey re main t he re longer a nd re ceive less d esira ble
placem ents than w hite child ren ; th ey a re also less likely t h a n w hit e child re n to be return ed
home or a dopted. Se e B. M ANDEL L, WHER E ARE TH E C HILDR EN? A CLASS ANALYS IS OF
FosTE R CAR E AND ADOPT ION 36 (1973); Gray & Nybell , supm, at 513- q ; Ste h no, Different ial
Treatment of M in01·ity Ch ildren i n Suvice Systems, 27 Soc. W o RK 39, 39- 41 (rg82). T hese
realities hav e led some Blac ks to dee m foster care a sys tem of legali zed slave r y. See B.
MAND ELL, supra, a t 6o. M a lc olm X desc ribed th e state's d is ruption of his own fa mily in these
ter ms:
Soon the state peo ple we re m a kin g pla ns to ta k e ove r a ll of m y moth e rs' children .
A Judge
in L a nsin g had a uthority ove r me a nd a ll of my brothe rs a nd siste rs.
W e we re "state children ," co urt wards; he h a d the full say-so ove r us . A white m a n in
cha rge of a bl ac k ma n 's children ' No thin g but legal , mod er n slavery - howeve r kin d ly
intenti oned.
I t ru ly b elieve t hat if eve r a state social age ncy des troye d a fam il y, it destroyed ours.
M . LI TTLE, TH E AUTOB IOGRAPHY OF M ALCOL M X 20 -2 I (196 5).
11 0 See \Vald , supra note 53. a t 629 n.22.
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authorities than neglect on the part of more affluent parents . 111 Black
children are also removed from their homes in part because of the
child welfare system's cultural bias and application of the nuclear
family pattern to Black families. 112 Black childrearing patterns that
diverge from the norm of the nuclear family have been misinte rpreted
by government bureaucrats as child neglect. 11 3 For example, child
welfare workers have often failed to respect the longstanding cultural
tradition in the Black community of shared parenting responsibility
among blood-related and non-blood kin . 1 14 The state has thus been
more willing to intrude upon the autonomy of poor Black families,
and in particular of Black mothers, while protecting the integrity of
white, middle-class homes.llS
T his devaluation of Black motherhood has been reinforced by
stereotypes that blame Black mothers for the problems of the Black
family. T his scapegoating of Black mothers dates back to slavery,
when mothers were blamed for the devastating effects on their children of poverty and abuse of Black women. When a one-month-old
slave girl named Harriet died in the Abbeville District of South Carolina on December 9, 1849 , the census marshal reported the cause of
death as '"[s]mothered by carelessness of [her] mother."' 116 This report
was typical of the United States census mortality schedules for the
southern states in its attribution of a Black infant death to accidental
suffocation by the mother. 117 Census marshal Charles M. Pelot explained: "'I wish it to be distinctly understood that nearly all the
accidents occur in the negro population, which goes clearly to prove
their great carelessness & total inability to take care of themselves. "' 11 8
It now appears that the true cause of these suffocation deaths was
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome. 119 Black ch ildren died at a dramat1: 1

See F alle r & Ziefert, supra note 6z , at 47; VI/aid, supra note 53, at 629 n .2I. For a
dis cu ssio n of the connection between the c hild w elfare system and poverty, see Jenkins, Ch ild
Welfare as a Class System, in CHILDREN AND D ECENT PEO PLE 3- 4 (A . Schorr ed. I974l' 12 Cf Santosky v . Kramer, -t55 U.S. 745, 763 (r gSz) (notin g that termination proceedings
"are often vulnerab le to judgments base d on cultural or class bias"); Gray & Nybell, supm note
rog, at 515-17; Stack, Cultural Perspect iv es on Child Welfare, r2 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 539, 54 1 (r9 83-84). See genaallv A. BILLING SLEY & J_ GIOVANNONI , CI-IJLDREN OF
THE STORM (19721 (tracing the hi sto ry of Black children in the American child welfare sys tem)_
:!3 S ee Gray & Nybe ll , supra note 109, at 515 - q; Stack, sup-ra note 11 2, at 54r. For
des criptions of chil d rearing patte rn s in the Black community that are considered deviant, such
as extended kin networks, seeR. H ILL, I NFORMAL ADOPTION AMONG B LACK fAMILIES (19/i);
a n d C. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STR.>\TEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COMMU:--!ITY 62-107
( 1974).

S ee Stac k , s u.!Jra no te r u , at 539-43Se e id. a t 54711 6 J oh nson , supm n o te ! , at 493 (quoting S. Cc.roiina Mo rtality Schedules, r 850, A bbev ill e
Dist rict)_
114

115

117

118

S ee id. at 493-96.
Id. at 49 5 (quoting S. C arolina lVIorta lity Sc hedules , r3s o, Abbeville District )_

119 See id. a l 496- soS; Savitt , Smothering and OveYlaying of Virginia Slave Children : A
Su gge st ed Explanatio n , 49 BULL. HrsT. IviED. 400, 400 (1975L
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ically higher rate because of the hard physical work, poor nutrition,
and abuse that their slave mothers endured during pregnancy. 120
The scapegoating of Black mothers has manifested itself more
recently in the myth of the Black matriarch, the domineering female
head of the Black family. White sociologists have held Black matriarchs responsible for the disintegration of the Black family and the
consequent failure of Black people to achieve success in America. 121
Daniel Patrick Moynihan popularized this theory in his rg65 report,
The Negro Family: The Case for National Action . 122 According to
Moynihan:
At the heart of the deterioration of the fabric of the Negro society is
the deterioration of the Negro family. It is the fundamental cause of
the weakness of the Negro community . . . . In essence, the Negro
community has been forced into a matriarchal structure which, because it is so out of line with the rest of the American society, seriously
retards the progress of the group as a whole. 123

Thus, Moynihan attributed the cause of Black people's inability to
overcome the effects of racism largely to the dominance of Black
mothers.
C. The Sterilization of Women of Color

Coerced sterilization is one of the most extreme forms of control
over a woman's reproductive life. By permanently denying her the
right to bear children, sterilization enforces society's determ ination
that a woman does not deserve to be a mother. Unlike w hite women,
poor women of color have been subjected to sterilization abuse 124 for
decades. 12 5 The disproportionate sterilization of Black women is yet
120

Se e Johnson , supra note r , at so8- 2o .
Se e P. GIDDINGS, supra note gr , at 3 25-35; B. HOOKS , supra note q , at 70-83; R.
STA PLES, THE BLACK WO!VlAN IN A ME RICA I0- 34 (19 76) ; Benn ett & G resh a m , supra note Sg ,
a t I I?- IS.
122 OFFICE OF PLAN NI NG & POLI CY RESEARCH , U . S. DEP'T OF LABOR , THE N EGRO FAMI LY:
THE CAS E FOR N ATIO NAL ACTION ( I965 ).
123 !d. a t s.
124 "S te riliz ation a buse occurs w hen eve r the sterilization procedure is perfo rm ed u nder co n dition s th a t .
pressure an individual into agree ing to be sterilize d , or obsc ure the ris ks,
consequen ces , a nd a lternati v es assoc iated w ith steriliz a tio n ." Petc hesky, R eprodu ction , Ethi cs,
and P ubli c Poli cy: The F ed eYal St erlization Regulati ons, 9 HASTIN GS C ENTE R R EP . 29, 32
(19 79) ; see als o N ote , S teri lizat ion A bus e: Cur-rent S ta te of the Law and R em ed ies f or Ab use,
ro GO LD EN G ATE U. L. R Ev. r 147, I I 52-5 3 (I g8o) (listin g m a ny co mm on sit u a ti on s of sterili zation a buse).
J25 S ee A . D AV IS, supra note g r . at 2 1)-21 ; N sia h-J efferson , R eprodu ctiv e L aws , Wom en of
Color, an d Low -In co me W omen, in REP ROD UC TIV E LA WS FOR TH E I ggos, a t. 4 6- 4 7 (S. Co hen
& N. T aub ed s. rg88) . O ne st udy fo und that 43% of wo me n sterili zed in 19 73 un de r a fe d erall y
fund ed prog ram w ere Bl ac k , a lthough only 33 % of th e pati ents we re Bla ck. S ee N ote , su pm
note 124, at 11 53 n ..)o . Sp a nish-speakin g wo m en a re twice as li ke ly to be ste ril ized a s those
12 1
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another manifestation of the dominant society's devaluation of Black
women as mothers.
Sterilization abuse has taken the form both of blatant coercion and
trickery and of subtle influences on women's decisions to be sterilized.126 In the r 97os, some doctors conditioned delivering babies and
performing abortions on Black women's consent to sterilization. 127 In
a 1974 case brought by poor teenage Black women in Alabama, a
federal district court found that an estimated roo,ooo to rso,ooo poor
women were sterilized annually under federally-funded programs. 128
Some of these women were coerced into agreeing to sterilization under
the threat that their welfare benefits would be withdrawn unless they
submitted to the operation. 129 Despite federal and state regulations
intended to prevent involuntary sterilization, physicians and other
health care providers continue to urge women of color to consent to
sterilization because they view these women's family sizes as excessive
and believe these women are incapable of effectively using other
methods of birth control. 130
Current government funding policy perpetuates the encouragement
of sterilization of poor, and thus of mainly Black, women . The federal
government pays for sterilization services under the M edicaid program,131 while it often does not make available information about

who speak English. Se e Levin & Taub, R ep?"O duclive R ights, in WOMEN AND THE L AW
§ roA.o7[3][b], at 1oA-2 8 (C. Lefcourt ed. 1989). The racial disparity in sterilization cuts across
economic and educational lines, althcugh the frequency of sterilization is generally higher among
the poor and uneducated. Another study found that g. 7% of college-educated Black women
had been sterilized, compared to 5.6% of college-educated white women. Among women without
a high school diploma, 31.6% of Black women and 14.5% of white women had been sterilized.
See id.
126 See Clarke, Subtle Fo rms of St erilizatio n Abus e: A R eproducti1'e Rights Analys is , in
TEST-TUBE WOME N 120, 120-3 2 (R. Arditti , R. Klein & S. Minden eds. 1984); Nsiah-Jefferson ,
su pra note 125, at 44-45 ; Petchesky, supra note 124, at 32 .
12i S ee Nsiah-Jeffe rson , supra note 125, at 46-47.
128 Se e Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp . II 96, 11 99 (D .D .C. 1974), on remand sub nom .
Relf v. Mathews, 403 F. Supp. 123 5 (D. D.C. 1975), va cated su b nom. Relf v . Weinberger, 565
F.zd 722 (D. C. Cir. 1977).
129

See id .
S ee Nsiah-Jefferson, supra

note 125, at 47- 48; see also Note, supra note 124 , at 1rsg6o (noting the lac k of any sanctions fo r noncompliance with federal sterilization regulations).
In contrast to the encourageme nt of minority sterilization, our society views childbearing by
white women as desirable. Ruth Calker tells the story of a classmate of hers in law school who
decided to be sterilized. The unive rsity physician refused to allow her to unde rgo the procedure
unless she agreed to attend seve ral sessions with a psychiatrist, presumably to dissuade her from
her decision. See Calker. Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Towa rd Love, Compassion, and
Wis dom, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 1011, ro67 n. 196 (1989). Coiker recognizes that the "physician's
actions reflect the dominant sociai message - that a healthy (white) woman should want to
bear a child ' ' I d .
131 Subchapters XlX and XX of the Social Security Act provide matching funds for sterilization reimburseme nt. See 4 2 U.S.C. ~~ 1396a(1o)(A.). 1397a(a)(2) (1988).
130
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and access to other contraceptive techniques and abortion. 132 In effect,
sterilization is the only publicly-funded birth control method readily
available to poor women of color.
Popular images of the undeserving Black mother legitimate government policy as well as the practices of health care providers. The
myth of the Black Jezebel has been supplemented by the contemporary
image of the lazy welfare mother who breeds children at the expense
of taxpayers in order to increase the amount of her welfare check. 133
This view of Black motherhood provides the rationale for society's
restrictions on Black female fertility. 134 It is this image of the undeserving Black mother that also ultimately underlies the government's
choice to punish crack-addicted women.

132 See Nsiah-J efferson, supra note I2 5, at 45-46; Petchesky, supra note 12 4, at 39; Note,
su pra note 124 , at I I 54·
133 See Harrington, Introduction to S. SHEEHAN , A WELFA RE M OTHER at x- xi (I976);
MILWAUKEE COUNTY WELFARE RIGHTS 0RG., WELFARE MOTHERS SPEAK OUT 72 - 92 (1972).
In a chapter entitled "Welfare Mythology," the Milwaukee Co unty Welfare Ri ghts Organization
portrays a common image of welfare mothers:
You give those lazy, shiftless good-for-nothings an inch and they'll take a mil e. You
have to make it tou gher on th em. They're gettin g away w ith murder now. You have
to catch all those cheaters and put th e m to work or put them in jail. G et them off the
welfare roils. I'm tired of those niggers coming to our state to ge t on welfare. I'm tired
of paying their bills just so they can sit around home ha vi ng babies, watching their color
tel evision s, and driving Cadillacs.

I d. at 72 . Writers in the I98os claimed that welfare induces poor Black women to have babies.
See, e.g .. C. MURRAY , LOSING GROUND I54- 66 (I9 84l. Other researchers have refuted this
claim . See, e.g., Darity & Myers, Does Welfare Dependency Cause Female Headship? The Case
of th e Black Family, 46 ]. MARRIAGE & FAM. 765, 773 (I984l (concluding that "[t]he attractiveness of we lfare and welfare d epe nden cy exhibit no effe cts on black femal e famil y heads" ).
134 This thinking was refl ected in a re ce nt news paper edito rial suggesting that Black women
on welfare should be given in ce nti ves to use Norplant , a TJew contraceptive. See Poverty and
Norplant: Can Contraception Reduce the Undo·class?, Phil a. Inquirer, Dec. 12, I 990, at A18,
col. r. On J a nuar y 2 , r 99I , a California judge ordered a Black woman on welfare who was
co nvi cted of child abuse to use Norplant for three years as a cond ition of probation . See Lev,
Judg e Is Firm on Forc ed Contraception , but Welcom es an Appeal , NY. Times, J an. II, 199I,
at A q, col. I; see also Lewin, Implan ted Birth Control Devic e Renews Debate over Foned
Contmception, N.Y. Times , Jan. IO, I9 91, at Azo col. I (reviewing the de bate on forced use
of Norp lant). The condemnation of sin gle mothers can also be seen as penalizi ng poor Black
women for departing from white middle-class norms of motherh ood. C). Chambers v. Omaha
Girls Cl ub , 834 F.2d 697 (8 th Cir. 1987) (affirming di smissal of title VII action brou ght by an
unmarried Black staff member of a private girls' club who was fir ed beca use she became
pregnant). Regina Austin suggests that "young , sin gle, sexuall y active, fertil e . and nurturing
black women are being viewed ominously because th ey have th e te m erity to attem pt to bre ak
out of the rigid economic, social , and political categories that a rac ist, sex ist , a nd class-stratified
society would im pose u po n them." Austin, supm no te I!f, at 555·
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PROSECUTING DRUG ADDICTS AS PuNISHMENT
FOR HAVING BABIES

Informed by the historical and present devaluation of Black motherhood, we can better understand prosecutors' reasons for punishing
drug-addicted mothers . This Article views such prosecutions as
punishing these women, in essence, for having babies; judges such
as the one who convicted Jennifer Johnson are pronouncing not
so much "I care about your baby" as "You don't deserve to be a
mother."
It is important to recognize at the outset that the prosecutions are
based in part on a woman's pregnancy and not on her illegal drug
use alone. 135 Prosecutors charge these defendants not with drug use,
but with child abuse or drug distribution - crimes that relate to their
pregnancy. Mo reover, pregnant women receive harsher sentences than
drug-addicted men or women who are not pregnant.l36
The unlawful nature of drug use must not be allowed to confuse
the basis of the crimes at issue. The legal rationale underlying the
prosec utions does not depend on the illegality of drug use. Harm to
the fetus is the crux of the government's legal theory. Criminal
charges have been brought against women for conduct that is legal
but was alleged to have harmed the fetus. 137
W hen a drug-addicted woman becomes pregnant, she has only one
realistic avenue to escape criminal charges: abortion. 138 Thus, she is
penalized for choosing to have the baby rather than having an abortion. In this way, the state's punitive action may coerce women to
have abortions rather than risk being charged with a crime. Thus, it
is the choice of carrying a pregnancy to term that is being penalized. l39
135 At Jennifer Johnson's sentencing, the prosecutor made clear the nature of the charges
against her: "About the end of December 1988, our office undertook a policy to begin to
deal with mothers !ike Jennifer Johnson
as in the status of a child abuse case,
Your Honor.
We have never v iewe d th is as a dntg case." Motion for Rehearing and
Sentencing at 12, State v. Johnson, No. E89-89o-C FA (Fla. C ir. Ct. Aug. 25, 1989) (emphasis
added)
13 6 The drug use r's pregnancy not only greatly increases the likelihood that she will be
prosec uted, but also greatl y enhances the penalty she faces upon conviction. In most states,
drug use is a misdemeanor, while distribution of drugs is a felon y. See Hoffman , supra notes ,
at 4413i Pamela Rae Ste wart, for example, was charged with criminal neglect in part because she
failed to follow her doctor's orders to stay off her feet and refrain from sexual intercourse while
she was pregnant. See People v. Stewart, No. Mso8r97, slip op. at 4 (Cal. Mun. Ct. Feb. 26,
1987); Bonavoglia, The Ordeal of Pamela Ra e Stewart, Ms., Jul./Aug. 198 7, at 92, 92.
138 Seeking drug treatment is not a viable alternative. First, it is likely th at the pregnant
addict will he unabl e to find a drug treatment program that will accept her. See infra notes
IS r- rss and accompanying text. Second, even if she successfully completes drug counseling by
th e end of her pregnancy, she may still be prosecuted for her drug use th at occ urred during
pregnancy before she was able to overcome her addictio n.
139 I recogniz e that both becom in g pregnant a nd continu ing a pregnancy to term are not
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There is also good reason to question the government's justification
for the prosecutions - the concern for the welfare of potential children. I have already discussed the selectivity of the prosecutions with
respect to poor Black women. 140 This focus on the conduct of one
group of women weakens the state's rationale for the prosecutions.
The history of overwhelming state neglect of Black children casts
further doubt on its professed concern for the welfare of the fetus.
When a society has always closed its eyes to the inadequacy of prenatal
care available to poor Black women, its current expression of interest
in the health of unborn Black children must be viewed with suspicion.
The most telling evidence of the state's disregard of Black children is
the high rate of infant death in the Black community. In I 987 , the
mortality rate for Black infants in the United States was I7 .g deaths
per thousand births- more than twice that for white infants (8.6). 141
In New York City, while infant mortality rates in upper- and middleincome areas were generally less than nine per thousand in I g86, the
rates exceeded nineteen in the poor Black communities of the South
Bronx and Bedford-Stuyvesant and reached 2 7. 6 in Central Harlem.142
The main reason for these high mortality rates is inadequate prenatal care. 143 Most poor Black women face financial and other barnecessarily real "choices" that women - particularly women of color and addicted women make . Rape, battery, Jack of available contraceptives, and prostitution induced by drug addiction may lead a woman to become pregnant without exercising meaningful choice. Similarly,
coercion from the father or her famil y, lack of money to pay for an abortion, or other barriers
to access to an abortion m ay force a woman to co ntinue an unw a nted pregnancy. Se e infra
note 2 11.
Nevertheless, these co nstraints on a wom a n's choice do not justify the gove rnm en t's punishment of the reproductive co urse that she ultimately foll ows. While we work to create the
conditions for meanin gful reproductive choice, it is important to affirm women's ri ght to be free
from unwanted state intrusion in their reproductive decisions.
140 See supra pp. 1432-36.
14 1 See U.S. DEP'T OF COMM ERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATI STICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 77 (table IIO) (1990). This mea ns that in 1987 , Black children were 2.08
times more likely than white children to die before reaching 0:1e year of age. This is the largest
gap between Black and white infant mortality rates since r 940, when infant mortality data were
first reported by race. See CHILDRE N'S DEFE NSE FUND, supm note 79, at 3·
14 2 See F. CARO, D. KALMUSS & I. LOPEZ, BARRIERS TO PRENATAL CARE I (1988). Another
example of the institutionali zed de val uation of Biack life is race-of-the-victim sentencing disparities. See Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court,
IOI HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1388-90 (!988).
!43 See Binsacca, Ellis, Martin & Petitti , Factors Associated with Low Birthweight in an
Inner-City Population: The Role of Financial Problems, 77 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH sos, 505
(1987); Leveno, Cunningham, Roark, Nelson & Williams, Prenatal Care an d the Low Birth
Weight Infa nt, 66 OBSTETRICS & GYN . 599 , 6o2 (1985). Babies born to wome n who receive no
prenatal care a re three times more likely to die within the first year than those born to women
w ho receive adeq uate care. See Hughes, Johnson , Rosenbaum & Simon s, The Health of America's Mot hers and Children: Trends in Access to Care, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REv . 472, 473 (1986) .
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riers to rece1vmg proper care during pregnancy. 1 44 In r g86, only half
of all pregnant Black womeri in America received adequate prenatal
care. 14 5 It appears that in the r g8os Black women's access to prenatal
care has actually declined. 146 The government has chosen to punish
poor Black women rather than provide the means for them to have
healthy children.

144

One of the most significant obstacles to receiving prenatal care is the inability to pay for
health care services. See CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, supra note i9, at 43-48; McNulty, supra
note 8, at 295-9i. Most poor women depend on overextended public hospitals for prenatal care
because of the scarcity of neighborhood physicians who accept Medicaid. See id. Institutional,
cultural, and educational barriers also deter poor women of color from using the few available
services. See generally F. CARO, D. KALMUSS & I. LOPEZ, supra note 142 (discussing institutional and cultural barriers to prenatal care among low-income women in New York City);
Curry, Nonfinancial Barriers to Prenatal Care, rs WOMEN & HEALTH 8S-8i (1989) (discussing
accessibility problems to needed health care sites); Zambrana, A Research Agenda on Issues
Affecting Poor and Minority Women: A Model for Understanding Their Health Needs, 14
WOMEN & HEALTH I37, I48-5o (1988) (discussing cultural barriers to prenatal care). A Haitian
woman's explanation of why she discontinued prenatal care illustrates these obstacles to the use
of public health facilities:
My friend say go to doctor and get checked. . . My friend be on the phone much
time before they make appointment. They no have space for 30 days.
When I go to hospital, it confusing.
. . I go early, and see doctor late in the
afternoon.
I wait on many long lines and take lots of tests. I no understand why
so many test every time. No one explain nothing. No one talk my language. I be tired,
feel sick from hospital. I go three times, but no more. Too much trouble for nothing.
F. CARO, D. KALMUSS & I. LOPEZ, supra note 142, at iS-j6.
1-1 5 See CHILDREN'S DEFENSE fUND, supra note i9, at 4 (table I. I). The percentage of
white women receiving adequate prenatal care was 72.6. See id.
14 6 See Hughes, Johnson, Rosenbaum & Simons, supra note 143, at 4i3-74; lVlcNulty, supra
note 8, at 2 93-94.
The percentage of Black women receiving prenatal care in the first three months of pregnancy
declined from a high of 62. i in I980 to 6r. I in I988. See Hilts, Life Expectancy for Blacks in
U.S. Shows Sharp Drop, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1990, at Bq, col. r. The percentage of babies
born to Black women getting no prenatal care increased from 8.8 in I980 to II.O in 1988. See
id.
The number of Black infant deaths could be reduced significantly by a national commitment
to ensuring that all pregnant women receive high-quality prenatal care. See generally Leu,
Legislaiive Research Bureau Report: A Proposal to Strengthen State Measures for the Reduction
of Infant ivlortality, 23 HARV. ]. LEGIS. 559 (I986) (proposing methods for delivering prenatal
care services to poor women). A recently revealed confidential draft of a report by the ·white
House Task Force on Infant Mortality recommends 18 specific measures costing a total of $480
million per year to reduce infant mortality. "The steps include expansion of Medicaid to cover
r 20,000 additional pregnant women and children in low-income families, an increase in Federal
spending on prenatal care and a requirement for states to provide a uniform set of Medicaid
benefits to pregnant women." Pear, Study Says U.S. Needs to Attack Infant Mortality, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 6, 1990, at B9, col. 3· Programs specifically designed to provide prenatal care to
low-income, high-risk women have succeeded in substantially reducing the rates of low birthweight and high infant mortality. See F. CARO, D. KALMUSS & I. LOPEZ, supra note 142, at
3-5. For discussions of recommendations of measures to increase the use of prenatal care by
poor women, see id. at 85-99; and Poland, Ager & Olson, supra note 45, at 303.
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The cruelty of this punitive response is heightened by the lack of
available drug treatment services for pregnant drug addicts. 14 7 Protecting the welfare of drug addicts' children requires, among other
things, adequate facilities for the mother's drug treatment. Yet a drug
addict's pregnancy serves as an obstacle to obtaining this treatment.
Treatment centers either refuse to treat pregnant women or are effectively closed to them because the centers are ill-equipped to meet the
needs of pregnant addicts. 148 Most hospitals and programs that treat
addiction exclude pregnant women because their babies are more
likely to be born with health problems reqmnng expens1ve
care. 149 Program directors also feel that treating pregnant addicts is
worth neither the increased cost nor the risk of tort liability. lSO
Moreover, there are several barriers to pregnant women who seek
to use centers that will accept them. Drug treatment programs are
generally based on male-oriented models that are not geared to the
needs of women. 151 The lack of accommodations for children is perhaps the most significant obstacle to treatment. M ost outpatient clinics do not provide child care, and many residential treatment programs
do not admit children. 152 Furthermore, treatment programs have
See Chavkin, Drug Addiction and Pregnancy: Policy CYOssroads, So AM.]. PuB. HEALTH
483, 485 (I990); McNulty, supm note 8, at 30I-02. A I979 national survey by the National
Institute on Drug Abuse found only 25 drug treatment programs that described themselves as
specifically geared to female addicts. See Chavkin, supra, at 485. The lack of facilities for
pregnant addicts in two cities illustrates the problem. A recent survey of 78 drug treatment
programs in New York City revealed that 54% denied treatment to pregnant women, 67%
refused to treat pregnant addicts on Medicaid, and 87% excluded pregnant women on Medicaid
addicted specifically to crack. Less than half of those programs that did accept pregnant addicts
provided prenatal care, and only two provided child care. Su Chavkin, Help, Don't Jail,
Addicted Mothers, N.Y. Times, July IS, I 989, at Az I, col. 2. Similarly, drug-addicted mothers
in San Diego must wait up to six months to obtain one of just 26 places in residential treatment
programs that allow them to live with their children. See Schachter, Help Is Hard to Find for
Addict Mothers: Drug Us e "Epidemic" Overwhelms Services, L.A. Times, Dec. 12, 1986, pt.
2, at I, col. I; Substance Abuse Treatment for Women: Crisis in Access, Health Advoc., Spring
1989, at 9, col. r. Furthermore, because Medicaid covers only Ii days of a typical 28-day
program, poor women may not be able to afford full treatment even at centers that will accept
them. See Hoffman, supra note 5, at 44148 See Cusky, Berger & Densen-Gerber, Issues in the TYeatment of Female Addiction: A
Review and Critique of the LiteratuYe, 6 CoNTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 307, 324-26 (I977); McNulty,
supm note 8, at 30I-02; Suffet, Hutson & Brotman, Treatment of the PYegnant Addict: A
Historical OveYview, in PREGNANT ADDICTS AND THEIR CHILDREN: A COMPREHENSIVE CARE
APPROACH I3, 21 (R. Brotman, D. Hutson & F. Suffet eds. 1984); Alters, supra note 30, at I,
col. r; Freitag, Hospital Defends Limiting of Drug Program, N.Y. Times, Dec. r 2, 1989, 2.t B9,
col. 1.
149 See McNulty, supra note 8, at 30I; Teltsch, supra note 30, at A14, col. r.
150 See Chavkin, DYug Addiction and Pregnancy: Policy CYossroads, supra note I47, at 485;
McNulty, Combatting Pregnancy Discrimination in Access to Substance A buse Treatment for
Low-Income Women, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 2 I, 22 (1989).
151 See Cuskey, Berger & Dcnsen-Gerber, supm note q8, at 312-14; A.!ters, suprrJ note 30,
147

at r, col.
152

I.

See l\1cl'Iulty, sup-ra note rso, at

Access, supra note 147,

at

g.

22;
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traditionally failed to provide the comprehensive services that women
need, including prenatal and gynecologic care, contraceptive counseling, appropriate job training, and counseling for sexual and physical
abuse . 15 3 Predominantly male staffs and clients are often hostile to
femal e clients and employ a confrontational style of therapy that
makes many women uncomfortable. 154 Moreover, long waiting lists
make treatment useless for women who need help during the limited
duration of their pregnancies. 155
F inally, and perhaps most importantly, ample evidence reveals that
prosecuting addicted mothers may not achieve the government's asserted goal of healthier pregnancies; indeed, such prosecutions will
prob ably lead to the opposite result. Pregnant addicts who seek help
from public hospitals and clinics are the ones most often reported to
government authorities. 15 6 The threat of prosecution based on this
reportin g forces women to remain anonymous and thu s has the perverse effect of deterring pregnant drug addicts from seeking treatment. 15 7 For this reason, the government's decision to punish drugaddic ted mothers is irreconcilable with the goal of helpin g them.

15.3 See C ha vkin, Dntg Addiction and Pregnancy: Policy Crossroads, supra note 14 7, at 485 ;
Chavkin, D river & Forman, The Crisis in N ew York City's Perinatal Servi ces , 89 N.Y. ST.].
MED . 6s8, 661 - 62 (1989).
15 4 See C hav kin , Drug Addictio n and P regnan cy: Policy Crossroads , supra note 147, at 485;
see also NATION AL I NSTITUTE ON D RUG ABUSE, DRUG DEPEN DE NCY I N PREGNANCY 4 6 (1978)
(desc ri bin g pe rvas ive ne gati ve a ttitu des towa rd pregnant addicts).
155 T he expe rie nce of one Black pregnant dru g addict , whom I will call Ma ry, exemplifies
the barr iers to care. Mar y needed to fi nd a residential dru g treatm ent program t hat prov ided
prena tal care a nd acc ommodations fo r her two children, ages three a nd eight. She tri ed to get
into H . U .G .S . (Hope , Unity and Growth ), th e sole residential treatm ent prog ra m for women
with children in Detroit, but there was no vacancy. Mary's only so urce of public prenatal care
was E lea nor Hutzel Hospital, which h as a clinic for high risk preg na ncies. She was also able
to receive dru g counseling on an outpati ent basis from the adjace nt E lea nore Hutzel Recov ery
Ce nter. But Mary encountered a n eight-week waiting list at the hospital, and inadeq uate public
transportati o n made it extremely d iffic ult for her to ge t th ere. In th e end, she rece ived defici ent
care for both her addi ction and her pregnancy. T ele phone Interv iew with Adrie nne Edmo nso nSmi th , Advoca te with the M a tern a l-C hild H ealth Ad vocacy Project , Way ne State U nive rsity
(J uly 25, 1990).
15 6 See Be rri en, Pregnancy and Drug Use : T he Dangerous and Unequal Use of P unitive
Measures, 2 YALE J.L. & FE M I N I SM 239, 24 7 (1990).
T he govern ment learned of Jennifer Jo hnso n's crack addiction onl y because she conf,ded her
ad di cti on to the obstetrician who delivered her baby at a public hospital. Her trust in her
docto r prompted the hospital to test J ohn so n a nd her baby for dru gs. See Bri ef of American
P ubli c Health Assoc iation and O th er Co nce rn ed Organizations as Amici C uri ae in Support of
Appellan t at 2, J ohn so n v. Sta te, No . 89- 1765 (Fl a. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 1989) . Moreove r,
t he state's entire p roof of J ohnson 's crim ina l in te nt was based on the th eory tha t J ohnso n's
atte m pts to ge t help for her addicti on sho wed th a t she kn ew th a t her cocaine use ha rmed the
fetu s. T he key evidence against her was th a t, a month befor e her daughte r's bi rth , J ohnson
had summoned a n amb ulan ce after a crac k binge because she was worried abo ut its effect on
her unborn chi ld. See Trial Tra nsc ript, supra note 4 , at 144.
15 7 See American rvl edic al Association. R.epo 1·t of th e Board of TYUsle es on Lega l lnte ;-;_•e n tion s
During Pregna;zcy : Court Orde red M edical Treahne n is and L egal Penalti es for Potent ially Hann-
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Pregnancy may be a time when women are most motivated to seek
trea tment for drug addiction and make positive lifestyle changes.1ss
The government should capitalize on this opportunity by encouraging
drug-addicted women to seek help and providing them with comprehensive treatment. Punishing pregnant women who use drugs only
exacerbates the causes of addiction - poverty, lack of self-esteem,
and hopelessness. 15 9 Perversely, this makes it more likely that poor
Black women's children - the asserted beneficiaries of the prosecutions - will suffer from the same hardships.

V.

PUNISHING BLACK MOTHERS AND THE
PERPETUATION OF RACIAL HIERARCHY

The previous Part showed how recent prosecutions have penalized
Black women for their reproductive choices based in part on society's
devaluation of Black motherhood. This analysis implicates two constitutional protections: the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment and the right of privacy. These two constitutional challenges a ppeal to different but related values. They are related 160 in
the sense that underlying the protection of the individual's autonomy
is the principle that all individuals are entitled to equal dignity. 16 1 A
basic premise of equality doctrine is that certain fundamental aspects
of the human personality, including decisional autonomy, must be
respected in all persons. 162 Theories of racial equality and privacy
can be used as related means to achieve a common end of eliminating
ful BehavioY by Pregnant Women, 264]. A.M.A. 2663, z66g (rggo). The reaction of pregnant
women in San Diego to the rg87 arrest of Pamela Rae Stewart for harming her unborn child
illustrates the deterrent effect of prosecution. Health care professionals reported that their
pregnant clients' fear of prosecution for drug use made some of them distrustful and caused
others to decline prenatal care altogether. See Moss, supm note 49, at I4II-I2.
158 See Note, supm note sr, at 766 & n.84; Chavkin, Help, Don't Jail, Addicted Mothers,
supra note 147 at A2 I, col. 2.
159 See Escamilla-lYiondanaro, Women: Pregnancy, Children and Addiction, 9 J- PsYCHEDELIC DRUGS 59, 59-60 (I977l; see also Zuckerman, Amaro, Bauchner & Cabral, Depressive
Symptoms During Pregnancy: Relationship to Poor II ealth Behaviors, r 6o AM. J- OBSTETRICS
& GYN. II07, II09 (rg8g) (stating that poor health behavior in pregnancy correlates with such
characteristics as "being single, older, unemployed, and having a lower income")_
160 See A. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A fREE SOCIETY 57-81 (rg88)
(noting similarity between benefits of privacy and equality for women). But see Sunstein, Sexual
01·ientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal
Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. rr6r, rqo-79 (rg88) (discussing differences between due process
liberty and equal protection). Laurence Tribe and Michael Dorf criticize Professor Sunstein for
failing to "take greater account of the inseparability of liberty and equality." Tribe & Dorf,
Levels ofGenerality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U CHI. L. REv. I057, rogs (rggo).
i6I See Karst, The Supreme Court, r976 Term Foreword: Equal Citizenship Undn the
.F01ateenth Amendment, 9I HARV. L. REv. I, 32 (I977lI62 SeeR_ DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-78 (I977l-
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the legacy of racial discrimination that has devalued Black motherhood. Both aim to create a society in which Black women's reproductive choices, including the decision to bear children, are given full
respect and protection.
The equal protection clause 163 embodies the Constitution's ideal of
racial equality. State action that violates this ideal by creating classifications based on race must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. 16 4
The equal protection clause, however, does not explicitly define the
meaning of equality or delineate the nature of prohibited government
conduct. As a result, equal protection analyses generally have divided
into two visions of equality: one that is informed by an antidiscrimination principle, the other by an antisubordination principle. 165
T he antidiscrimination approach identifies the primary threat to
equality as the government's "failure to treat Black people as individuals without regard to race. " 166 The goal of the antidiscrimination
principle is to ensure that all members of society are treated in a
color-blind or race-neutral fashion . Under this view of equality, the
function of the equal protection clause is to outlaw specific acts committed by individual government officials that discriminate against
individual Black complainants because of their race. T hus, this approach judges the legitimacy of government action from the perpetrator's perspective. 167 T he analysis focuses on the process by which
government decisions are made and seeks to purge racial classifications
from that process.
The Supreme Court's current understanding of the equal protection
clause is based on a narrow interpretation of the antidiscrimination
principle. 168 The Court has confined discrimination prohibited by the

163

The fourteenth amendment provides, in relevant part , that "[n]o State shall make or
enforce any law which shall . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the eq ual protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. ame nd. XIV, § r.
164 Racial classifications are he ld un constitutional absent a compelling gove rnmental justification. See Wy gant v. Jackson Bel. of Educ., 476 U .S. 267, 274 (1986) (plurality opinion) ;
Palmo re v. Sidoti , 466 U.S. 429, 432 (198 4); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICA N CONSTITUTIO NAL LAW § I6-6, at I45I-54 (2d ed.
r g88) (ex plaining the strict scrutiny standard).
165 These competing views of equal protection law have been variously characterized by
commentators. See , e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note I64, § r6-2r, at 1514-2I (describing the "antidiscrimination" and "antisubjugation" prin ciples); Brest, Th e Supreme Court, 1975 Term Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, go HARV. L. REv. r, 5 (1976)
(advocating the antidiscrimination principle as a theor y of racial justice); Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Prote ction , 6r N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1005-13 (rg86)
(comparing the "anti-differentiation " principle with the "anti-subordination " approach).
!66 Dimond, The Anti-Caste Principle Toward a Constitutional Standard for Review of
Race Cases, 30 WAYNE L. REV. I, I (I983).
16i See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Ti11"ough Antidiscrimination Law : .4
Critical Review of Supreme Cou·rt Doc trine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 , 1052 -57 (1978).
168 See Strauss, Discriminatory I ntent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CH I. L. REv. 935,
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Constitution to state conduct performed with a discriminatory intent. 169 State conduct that disproportionately affects Blacks violates
the Constitution only if it is accompanied by a purposeful desire to
produce this outcome. 170 Although recognized violations are not limited to explicit racial classifications, an invidious purpose cannot be
inferred solely from the adverse consequences of racially neutral policies.171 A Black complainant, therefore, need not produce a law that
expressly differentiates between whites a nd Blacks; but neither can
she simply demonstrate that a color-blind law has a clearly disproportionate impact on Blacks. As one commentator has noted, "the
Justices have demanded proof . . . that officials were 'out to get' a
person or group on account of race. " 172
Black women prosecuted for drug use during pregnancy nevertheless may be able to make out a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose . 173
The Court has recognized that a
selection process characterized by broad government discretion
that produces unexplained racial disparities may support the
presumption of discriminatory purpose . 174
In Castaneda v.

95 3-54 (1989). For an analysis of the development of Supreme Court antidiscrimination doctrin e,
see Dimond, supra note 166 , a t 16-42 ; and Freeman , supra note 167, at 1057-II18.
169 See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. M etropolitan H ous. Dev. Corp. , 42 9 U .S. 252,
265 (197 7) ; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239- 45 (1976).
Commentators have noted that the Court adopted the disc riminatory intent rul e not beca use
this standard is inherently required by the equal protecti on clause, but because it feared th e
remedies a discriminator y impa ct rule would enta il. See , e.g., Binion , Intent an d E qual Protec tion: A Reconsideration , 1983 SuP. CT . REv. 397, 404- 08; Kennedy, supra note 142, at 1414
(noting Justice Brennan 's derision of the Court's "fea r of too much justice ") ; Sch we mm , F rom
Washington to Arlington H eights and Beyond: Discrim inatory Purpose in Equ al Protecti on
Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L. F. 96 1, 1050.
1 iO Freeman recognizes in the Court's discrimin ator y intent standard the t win noti ons of
"fault" and "causation": proof of an equal protection violati on requires identifica.tion of a bl ameworth y perpetrator whose ac tions can be linked to th e v ictim 's injury. See Freeman , su pra note
r67, at ros4-56 ; see also Sullivan , The Suprem e Cou ·r t, r985 Term - C ommen t: Si ns of
DiscriminatiiJn : Last Term's Affirma t ive Action Cases, roo HARV . L. REv. 78, 8o (1986) (arg uing
th at "the Court has approved affirm a ti ve action only as precise penance for t he specific sins of
rac ism a government , union , or empl oyer has commi tted in the past") .
Ii i S ee Personnel Adm 'r v. F ee ney, 442 U.S . 256, 279 (1979); Kennedy, su pra note 142, at
1404.
Kennedy, supm note 142, at r405.
For a discussion of equal protection challenges to rac ially selective prosec uti ons, see
D evelopments in the Law - Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1472, 153249 (1 988) [hereinafter D eve lopments].
I i 4 See Kennedy, supra note 142, at 1425-2 7. S ee ge n erally N ote , To Infer or Not to infe r
a Discriminatory Purp ose: R ethink ing Equal Prot ect ion D octrine, 61 N . Y.U . L. REv. 334, 35162 (1986) (discu ssing th e impac t-inferenc e standa rd as ap plied to ju ry selecti on an d advocatin g
its extension to de ath pe nalty cases and other contexts). The cases in w hich th e Su preme Court
has applied this reasoning in volve challenges to the rac ia l composition of juries . Se e, e.g . ,
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, soo-or (1977); Tu rn er v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 360- 61
(1970) . The Court has not been willin g to extend t his reasoning to oth er claims of rac ial
I i2
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Partida, 175 for example , the C ourt held that the defendant demonstra ted a prima facie case of intentional discrimination in grand jury
selection by showing a sufficiently large statistical disparity between
the percentage of Mexican-Americans in the population (seventy-nine
percen t) and the percentage of those summoned (thirty-nine percent),
combined w ith a selection procedure that relied on the discretion of
jury commissioners. 176
Similarly, a B lack mother arrested in Pinellas C ounty, Florida
could make out a prima facie case of unconstitutional racial discrimination by showing that a disproportionate number of those chosen
for prosec ution for exposin g newborns to dru gs are Black. In particular, she could point out the disparity betwee n the percentage of
defendants who are Blac k a nd the percentage of pregnant substance
abuse rs w ho are Black. 177 The N ew England 1 ournal of Medi cine
study of p re gnant wom en in Pinellas County referred to earlier found
that only about twenty-six percent of those who used drugs were
Black . 17 S Yet over ninety percent of Florida prosecutions for drug
ab use d uring pregnancy have been brought a gainst Black women . 1 79
T he d efendant could buttress her case with the study's finding that,
d espite similar rates of substa nce abuse, Black wom en were ten times
mo re likely than white w om en to be reported to public health auth orities for substance abuse during pregnancy. 180 I n addition, the
defe ndant could show th a t both health care professionals and prosecutors w ield a great d eal of discretion in selecting w omen to be
subj ected to the crimina l justice system. 18 1 T he burden w ould then
shift to the state "to dispel the inference of intentional d iscrimina tion "
by justifying the ra ci al disc repancy in its prosec utions. 182
T he a ntisubordination approach to equality w ould not require
Black defendants to prove that the prosecutions a re motivated by
racial bias . Rather tha n requiring victims to p rove distinct instances
of discrimin ating beha vior in the administra tive p rocess, 183 the antid iscrimi nation in t he ad m inistration of crimin a l j usti ce . See Cardinale & Fe ldman , The Federal
Couds and the R ight to Nondi scriminatory Administration of the Criminal L aw: A Critical
View , 29 SYRACUSE L. REv. 659, 662 - 64 (1978); Ke nn ed y, supra note r.:p , a t 1402 (observi ng
tha t " no defendant in state or federal court has ever successfully challenged h is punishment on
g1·ounds of ra cial d iscrimination in se ntencing") (em phasis in original).
liS 430 U.S . 482 (1977).
li 6 Se e id . a t 494-97.
17 i See McC leskey v. Kem p, 481 U.S . 279, 349- 61 (1987) (B lac kmun ,]., dissenting) (applyin g
th e Cas tan eda tes t to a claim of dis crim inatory prosecution); Developments, supra note 17 3, at
1552-54 (advocating u se of an impact-infe rence sta ndard in the racial prosec uti on co ntex t).
178 See Chasnoff, Land ress & Barrett, supra note 65, at 12 04 (table 2).
179 See State Case Summary, supra no te 2, at 3- 5.
180 See supra p. 1434.
13 1 See su pra p. 1433·
182 Castaneda v. Partida , 430 U.S. 482, 497- 98 (1977 ).
J83 See Binion, supya note r69, at 407-08
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subordination approach considers the concrete effects of government
policy on the substantive condition of the disadvantaged. 18 4 This
perspective recognizes that racial subjugation is not maintained solely
through the racially antagonistic acts of individual officials. 185 It
instead views social patterns and institutions that perpetuate the inferior status of Blacks as the primary threats to equality. The goal of
antisubordination law is a society in which each member is guaranteed
equal respect as a human being. Under this conception of equality,
the function of the equal protection clause is to dismantle racial hierarchy by eliminating state action or inaction that effectively preserves Black subordination. 186
The prosecution of drug-addicted mothers demonstrates the inadequacy of antidiscrimination analysis and the superiority of the antisubordination approach. Rather than conform Black women's experiences to the intent standard, we can use those experiences to reveal
the narrowmindedness of the Court's view of equality. F irst, the
antidiscrimination approach may not adequately protect Black women
from prosecutions' infringement of equality, because it is difficult to
identify individual guilty actors. Who are the government officials
motivated by racial bias to punish Black women? The hospital staff
who test and report mothers to child welfare agencies? The prosecutors who develop and implement policies to charge women who use
drugs during pregnancy? Legislators who enact laws protecting the
unborn?
It is unlikely that any of these individual actors intentionally singled out Black women for punishment based on a conscious devaluation of their motherhood. The disproportionate impact of the p rosecutions on poor B lack women does not result from such isolated,
individualized decisions. Rather, it is a result of two centuries of
systematic exclusion of Black women from tangible and intangible
benefits enjoyed by white society. Their exclusion is reflected in Black
women's reliance on public hospitals and public drug treatment centers, in their failure to obtain adequate prenatal care, in the more

See Kennedy, supm note 142 , at 1424-25.
S ee L. TRIBE , su pra note r 64 , § r 6- zr, at rsr 8 , 1520- z r.
ISo See \Vest, Pro gress ive and Co n savative Co nst itu tio nalism , supm note q , a t 693 - 94 .
P rofessor Tribe and others ha ve argued that the a ntisub ordin ation view of equ ality is more
faithful to the historical origins of the Civil War amendments, which were drafted spec ifi cally
to eradicate racial hierarchy. See L. TRIBE , supm note 164, § r6-zr, at rsr6; Freem a n , supra
note r 67 , at ro6r. In th e C ivil Ri ghts Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (r 883), for example, the C ourt asse rte d
tha t th e thirteenth a mendm ent abo li shes "all bad ges a nd incid ents of slaver y." I d . at zo. In
th e Sla ughter-House Cases, 83 US . ( r6 Wall. ) 36 (1873) , the Court identified as the "one
pe rvadin g purpose" of the a mendments "the fr eedom of the slave race , the sec uri ty a nd firm
es ta blishment of that fr eed om , a nd the protection of the new ly-made fre em a n and citize n fro m
th e opp ressions of th ose w ho had formerl y exercised unli mited dominion ove r him ." I d. a t 7 I.
184

ISS
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frequent reporting of Black drug-users by health care professionals,
and in society's acquiescence in the government's punitive response to
the problem of crack-addicted babies.
More generally, the antidiscrimination principle mischaracterizes
the role of social norms in perpetuating inequality. This view of
equality perceives racism as disconnected acts by individuals who
operate outside of the social fabric. 187 The goal of the equal protection
clause under this world view is "to separate from the masses of society
those blameworthy individuals who are violating the otherwise shared
norm. " 188
The prosecutions of drug-addicted mothers demonstrate how dramatically this perspective departs from reality. It is precisely a shared
societal norm - the devaluation of Black motherhood - that perpetuates the social conditions discussed above and explains why B lack
women are particularly susceptible to prosecution. The Court's vision
of equality acquiesces in racist norms and institutions by exempting
them from a standard that requires proof of illicit motive on the part
of an individual governmental actor. The inability to identify and
blame an individual government actor allows society to rationalize the
disparate impact of the prosecutions as the result of the mothers' own
irresponsible actions. Formal equality theory thus legitimates the subordination of Black women .
In contrast to the antidiscrimination approach, antisubordination
theory mandates that equal protection law concern itself w ith the
concrete ways in which government policy perpetuates the inferior
status of Black women. T he law should listen to the voices of poor
Black mothers and seek to eliminate their experiences of subordinatio n. F rom this perspective , the prosecutions of crack-addic ted mothers are unconsti tutional because they reinforce the myth of the undeserving Black mother by singling out - whether intentionally or not
- Black women for punishment. The government's punitive policy
reflects a long history of denigration of Black mothers dating back to
slavery, and it serves to perpetuate that legacy of unequal respect.
The p rosecutio ns should therefore be upheld only if the state can
demon strate that t hey serve a compelling interest that could not be
achieved through less discriminatory means. 189
Although the state's asserted interest in ensuring the health of
babies is sub stantial, prosec ution does not advance t hat interest in a
sufficiently narrow fashion. F irst, as I have noted, the govermn.e nt's
187 See Freema n, supra note r 67, at 1054.
Kimberl e C renshaw similarly demo nstrates how
the "rest rictive view" of a ntidiscrimination law ass umes th a t a racial ly eq uitabl e society alread y
exists. C rens haw, supra note 14, a t !3 44·
ISS F reeman , su pra note 16 7, at I05 4 ·
189 See Binion, supra note r69, at 447~48
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punitive course of action is inimical to the goal of healthier pregnancies
because it deters women from seeking help. 19° In addition, even if
the prosecutions could be proved to further the state's interest in
children's welfare, they would not survive the "least restrictive alternative" standard. That standard requires that "even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot
be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved. " 191 A public commitment to providing adequate prenatal care for poor women and drug
treatment programs that meet the needs of pregnant addicts would be
a more effective means for the state to address the problem of drugexposed babies.1 92
By prosecuting crack-addicted mothers, the government helps to
perpetuate the dominant society's devaluation of Black motherhood.
The antisubordination analysis better uncovers this institutional,
rather than individualistic, mechanism for maintaining racial inequality. The government's policy cannot withstand the scrutiny of an
equality jurisprudence dedicated to eradicating hierarchies of racial
privilege. Still, the focus purely on equality does not address the
unique significance of punishing the decision to bear a child. T he
remainder of this Article examines how the prosecutions v iolate Black
women's right of privacy and the relationship between that privacy
analysis and the goal of racial equality.

VI . A

CRITICAL AssESSMENT oF A RG U M ENT S
AGAINST INTERVENTION

There is now a substantial body of scholarship challenging state
intervention in pregnant women's conduct. 193 Yet much of the literature has not sufficiently taken into account the experien ce of poor
Black women, the very women who are most affected. I n addition,
the literature has failed to address adequately the arguments on behalf
of fetal protection. In this Part, I will critique v arious reproductive
rights theories that have been used to challenge the control of pregnant
women and show why they are not helpful in add ressin g the prosecution of drug-addicted mothers. In Part VII, I w ill p resent a privacy
argument th at more effectively confronts the government's policy.
T hat analysis better explains the constitutional injury caused by the
prosecutions because it recognizes race as a critical fa ctor.
190

S ce supra notes r 56- r 57 a nd accompan ying text.

19 1

Shei ton v. T ucker, 364 U.S . 479, 488 (r 96o).

192

S ee S! tpm notes 143-15 5 a nd accompanyin g te xt.
Se e so ur ces cite d supra no teS.

l 9j
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A. Bodily Autonomy and Integrity
Much of the discourse challenging state intervention in the decisions of pregnant women has occurred in the context of forced medical
treatment. 19 4 Many commentators have argued th at judicial decisions
that allow doctors to perform surgery and other procedures on a
pregnant woman without her consent violate women's right to bodily
autonomy and integrity. 195 It is difficult , however, to transfer the
scholarship addressin g compelled medical procedures to the issue of
drug-addicted mothers.
The interests of the drug-addicted mother appear to be weaker for
three reasons . First, unlike forced medical treatment, punishing the
pregnant drug addict does not require her to take affirmative steps to
benefit the fetus. She is not asked to be a good samaritan; rather,
she is punished for affirmatively doing harm to the fetu s. Second,
the prosecution of drug-addicted mothers involves no direct physical
intrusion . Nor do prosecutions deprive women of control over their
bodies by directly compelling them to undergo an unwanted biological
process, as is the case with the prohibition of abortion. On this level,
punishin g dru g-addicted mothers does not seem to implicate a mother's
right to bodily integrity at all.
Third , the mother's drug use has potentially devastating effects on
the fetus and lacks any social justification . Indeed , forcin g a woman
to refrain from using harmful dru gs through incarceration or court
order m ay be seen as a benefit to th e women herself, whereas forc ed
medic al procedures often aid the fetu s only at th e expense of the
moth er 's health or her deeply held religious beliefs. It is therefore
harder to identify how the government's action infringes a constitution ally protected interest. Consequently, some commentators who
oppose the regulation of some potentially harmful conduct during
pregnancy at the same time justify punishment of pregnant drug
users. 196 vVe must therefor e draw on another principle of autonomy
to de scribe th e infrin gement caused by these prosecutions: the right
to make decisions about reproduction (here, the choice of carryin g a
pregn ancy to term).
In addition, many of the issues raised by forced medical treatment
seem disconnected fr om the experiences of poor women of color. 19 7
194 See, e.g., Ga llagher, supra note 8, at 46- 58; Nelson , Buggy & \Veil, F orc ed l'vf edical
Treatm ent of Preg nant Wo m en: "Compelli ng Each to Liv e as Se em s Goo d to th e R est" , 3 7
H ASTI NGS L. ]. 703 (198 6) ; R hode n , The J udge in t.he D elivery R oom: Th e Em erge nce of CourtOrdered Ces areans, 74 C ALIF . L. REv . 1951 (1986 ).
195 S ee , e.g., Gold berg , su pra note 8, a t 6r 8- 23 ; Nel so n , Buggy & Wei! , supra note 194 , a t
750- 5 7; Rh ode n , supra note 194, at 196 7- 75 , 1995-99 .
l 96 S ee , e .g. , Stearns, lv! at.emal Duties During P regnancy: To w ard a Co nceptu al Fra·m.ework ,
21 N Ew ENG . L. REv . 595 , 62 9- 33 (198s -86); N ote, lV! at emal Righ ts and F etal Wron gs : The
Case A gainst th e Crim inaliza tion of "F etal A buse," 10 1 H ARV. L. R EV . 994, 100 7 (1988).
197 Th is is no t to say th a t forc ed med ica l treatme nt has no releYance to the li ves of poo r
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For example, much of the literature focuses on ethical issues arising
from treating the fetus as a patient and its impact on the relationship
between the pregnant woman and her physician. 198 This debate is
largely irrelevant to poor Black women, the majority of whom receive
inadequate prenatal care. 1 99 Their major concern is not having an
ethical conflict with their doctor, but affording or finding a doctor in
the first place . The issue of whether intricate fetal surgery may be
performed against a mother's will is far removed from the urgent
needs of poor women who may not have available to them the most
rudimentary means to ensure the health of the fetus. 200
Forced treatment decisions equate women with inert vessels, disregard their own choices, and value them solely for their capacity to
nurture the fetus. 2 0 1 Although this view of women is reflected as well
in the prosecution of drug-addicted mothers, it does not grasp the full
indignity of the state's treatment of poor Black women. Government
control of pregnancy perpetuates stereotypes that value women solely
for their procreative capacity. But the prosec utions of crack addicts
deny poor Black women even this modicum of value. By punishing
them for having babies, they are deemed not even worthy of the
dignity of childbearing. Thus, the prosec utions debase Black women

women of color. In fact, court-o rdered medical procedures are performed disproportionately on
preg nant minority women. A study of IS court-ordered cesarians published in I 987 fo und that
So% in vo lved wo men of color; 27% of the wo men were not nat ive English speake rs . See Koldcr,
Gallag her & Parsons, CouYt-Orde1·ed ObstetYical Interventions, 3 I6 NEw ENG. ]. MED. I I 92,
r 193 (1987); see also Daniels, CouYt-Ordercd Cesareans: A Crowing Concern for I ndigent Women,
2 T CLEARING HOUSE REv. I064, 1065 (I988) (comparing the ge neral distribution of cesarian
sections with that of cesarians performed pursuant to court order); Gallagher, Fetus as Patient,
in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990S, supra note 125, at 157, I83-84 (discussing the discrimin atory impact of forced medical treatment).
198 See, e.g., Fletcher, Th e Fetus as Patient : Ethical I ssues , 246 ]. A.M.A . 772 (1981);
Comme nt, Th e Fetal Patient and the Unwill ing !VI other: A Standard for Judi cial I ntervention,
14 PAC. L.]. ro6s, ro65-79 (r983).
199 See supra notes 147 & 148 .
zoo T he punishment of drug-addicted mothers ra ises ethi cal iss ues affecting poor women of
color, howe ve r, beca use drug-addicted mothers are often reported to gove rnment a uthorities by
their own phys icians. In th e J ohnson trial , for example, J ohnso n's obstetricians provided the
most damaging evidence aga inst her by testifying that Johnso n had admitte d to them that she
had smoked crack soon before both of her children were de li ve red. See Trial Transcript, supra
note 4, at r 5, 70. Punishin g pregnan t women based on information from their doctors und ermines th e confidential doctor-patient relationship and deters women from sharing important
information with health care providers or even from obtaining prenatal care . See Berrien, supra
note I56, at 247; Moss, supya note 49, at I4I I-1z; Roberts, supra note 2, at 6o-6r.
20 1 See, e.g. , Annas, Predicting the Future of PYivacy in Pregnancy: Ho w Medical Technology Affects the L egal Rights of P1·egnant Women, I 3 NOVA L. REv. 329, 345 (1989) ("Treatin g
th e fetus agai nst th e will of the mothe r requires us to degrade and deh um a ni ze the mother a nd
treat her as an inert container."); Gallaghe r, supra note 8, at 2 7 ("The indi vidual wome n
themse lves become invisi bl e or viewed only as vesse ls - carriers of an infinite ly more valuab le
being.").
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even more than forced medical treatment's general devaluation of
women. 202

B. The Right to Make Medical and Lifestyle Decisions
A second approach challenges restrictions on maternal conduct
during pregnancy by advocating a woman's right to make medical
and lifestyle decisions. zo3 Rather than focus on a woman's right to
protect her body from physical intrusion, this approach focuses on a
woman's right to engage in activities of her choice free from government interference. This argument also loses its force in the context
of maternal drug addiction. While the danger of government restrictions on a pregnant woman's normal conduct may be apparent, drug
use during pregnancy arguably belongs in a separate category. The
pregnant drug addict is not asked to refrain from generally acceptable
behavior, such as sexual intercourse, work, or exercise. Rather, society demands only that she cease conduct that it already deems illegal
and reprehensible.
Arguments based on a woman's right to make decisions about her
pregnancy and her fetus also appear weak in the context of maternal
drug addiction. Unlike healthy mothers, 2 0 4 pregnant drug addicts are
not better able to make lifestyle and medical decisions that affect the
fetus than the state or physicians. Nor can we say that a decision to
carry a fetus to term automatically demonstrates that a drug-addicted
mother cares deeply for it and is in a better position to monitor her
own conduct during pregnancy than the state. Most would agree that
the pregnant drug addict has exercised poor judgment in caring for
herself and her fetus. The state should not substitute its judgment
for that of the "normal" mother, but intervention in the case of the
drug addict seems more justified.
Although the government is arguably better able to make decisions
about the care of the fetus than the drug-addicted mother, it is quite
a different matter to allow the government to determine who is entitled
to be a mother. State interference in the decision to bear a child is
202

See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 8, at 6or-o4; King, Should J'v!om Be Constrained in the
Best Interests of the Fetus?, :3 NOVA L. REv. 393, 39i (1989); Note, supra note 8, at 613;
Note, supra note 196, at 998-rooz.
204 See, e.g., Note, supra note 8, at 6 I 3 ("[B]ecause the decisions a woman makes throughout
her pregnancy depend on her individual values and preferences, complicated sets of life circumstances, and uncertain probabilities of daily risk, the woman herself is best situated to make
these complex evaluations."); Note, Rethinking (iv!)otherhood: Feminist Theory and State Regulation of Pregnancy, 103 H ARV. L. REV. 1325, 1339-41 (1990) (arguing that "the pregnant
woman's physical and psychological position with respect to the fetus makes her a uniquely
appropriate decisionmaker").
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constitutionally more significant than state control of lifestyle decisions.
The interference-in-women's-lifestyles approach also neglects the
concerns of poor women of color. A common criticism of the prosecution of drug-addicted mothers is that the imposition of maternal
duties will lead to punishment for less egregious conduct. Commentators have predicted government penalties for cigarette smoking, consumption of alcohol, strenuous physical activity, and failure to follow
a doctor's orders. 205 Although valid , this argument ignores the reality
of poor Black women whom are currently being arrested. T he reference to a parade of future horribles to criticize the fetal rights
doctrine belittles the significance of current government action. It
seems to imply that the prosecution of Black crack addicts is not
enough to generate concern and that we must postulate the prosecution
of white middle-class women in order for the challenge to be meaningful. 206
C. The Focus on Abortion

Another aspect of the reproductive rights literature that limits our
understanding of reproductive choice is its focus on abortion rights.
One problem is that this focus provides an inadequate response to a
central argument in support of the regulation of pregnancy. John
Robertson, for example, has contended that if a woman forgoes her
right to an abortion, she forfeits her right to autonomy and choice. 20 7
If abortion is the heart of women's reproductive rights , then state
policies that do not interfere with that right are acceptable. 20 8 Similarly, if the full extent of reproductive freedom is the right to have an
abortion, then a policy that encourages abo rtion 209 - such as the
205

See, e.g., l\-1oss, supra note 2, at z88-89; Note, supya note 8, at 6o6-o;.
I recognize, however, th e tactical benefit of dem onstrat ing that the prosecution of pregnant
crack addicts should be the concern of all women. It may be more effective poli tically to
convince affluent women that such government polic ies also jeo pardize their lifestyles.
207 See Robertson , supra note 13, at 43 7- 38, 445 - 41 ("[The woman] waived her ri ght to
resis t bodily intrusions made for th e sake of the fetu s when she chose to continu e th e pregnancy."); Robertson , Th e Right to Procuate and I n Utero Fetal Th erapy , 3 ]. LEGAL MED.
333, 359 (rg82); see also Shaw, Conditional Prospective R ights of the Fetus , 5 ]. L EGAL ME D.
63, 88 (1984) (arguing that the mother's duty to pro tec t th e fetus from harm increases aft er
viability "because she has forgone her right to choose abo rtion").
zos See, e.g., Mathieu, R espec ting Liberty and Preve ntin g Harm: Limits of State Int ervent ion
in Prenatal Choic e , 8 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL 'Y r g , 32 - 37 (rg8sl (arg uing that th e ri ght to a n
a bortion is not inconsistent with th e duty to prevent or not cause ha rm to the fetu s); Walker &
Puzder, State Pro tection of the Unborn After Roe \". Wade: .-1 L eg islatic•e Propo sal , 13 STETSON
L. REv. 23 7, 24 1 , 253 ( r 984) (arguin g that extend ing the fou rtee nth a mendm ent's protection to
unborn chi ldren wou ld not impair women's right to abo rti o n).
209 The prosecution of dru g-addicted mothers can be see n as encouraging abortion because
pregnant drug-addi cts may feel press ure to abort the fet us ra th er than risk being cha rged w ith
a crim e.
206
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prosecution of crack-addicted mothers - does not interfere with that
freedom. 210
As in the previous approaches, the emphasis on abortion fails to
incorporate the needs of poor women of color. The primary concern
of white, middle-class women are laws that restrict choices otherwise
available to them, such as statutes that make it more difficult to
obtain an abortion. The main concern of poor women of color, however, are the material conditions of poverty and oppression that restrict
their choices. 211 The reproductive freedom of poor women of color,
for example, is limited significantly not only by the denial of access
to safe abortions, but also by the lack of resources necessary for a
healthy pregnancy and parenting relationship. 212 Their choices are
limited not only by direct government interference with their decisions,
but also by government's failure to facilitate them. The focus of
reproductive rights discourse on abortion neglects this broader range
of reproductive health issues that affect poor women of color. 213 Adno See Stearns, supra note 196, at 604 ("It is inconsistent to argue that a [pre-natal duty]
rule unconstitutionally removes the right to abort if in fact the rule actually encourages women
to exercise that very right.").
21 J If the facilities necessary to effectuate a reproductive decision cost money, poor women
may not be able to afford to take advantage of them. Prenatal care, abortion services, artificial
insemination, fetal surgery, contraceptives, and family planning counseling are some examples
of the means to realize a reproductive choice that may be financially inaccessible to low-income
women. See generally Gertner, Interference with RepYOductive Choice, in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS
FOR THE Iggos, supra note 125, at 307, 307-I2 (discussing economic and legal obstacles to
reproductive choice); Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 125, at 20-23, so-SI (discussing limitations on
access to abortion services and new reproductive technology).
In Roberts, The Future of Reproductive Choice for Poor Women and Women of Color, I2
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 59 (Iggo), I describe the constraints on the reproductive choices available
to a hypothetical pregnant young woman in the inner city. See id. at 62-64.
212 See supra note I44·
2l.l An example of how the unilateral focus on abortion has neglected and even contradicted - the interests of poor women of color is the pro-choice opposition to sterilization reform
in the I970s. In I977, the Committee to End Sterilization Abuse introduced in the New York
City Council guidelines to prevent sterilization abuse, an important issue for women of color.
See supra notes I24-130. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare also considered
the guidelines in I979· The guidelines had two key provisions: they required informed consent
in the preferred language of the patient and a 30-day waiting period between the signing of the
consent form and the sterilization procedure. Representatives of the National Abortion Rights
Action League and Planned Parenthood testified against the New York and national guidelines
as restrictions on women's access to sterilization. See Tax, Tax Replies, NATION, July 24/3I,
Ig8g, at I ro, 148 (rg8g) (letter to the editor); see also Petchesky, supra note 124, at 35-39
(discussing arguments asserted by opponents of the federal sterilization regulations).
The abortion rights of women of color have also been overlooked. One example is the
belated political mobilization on the part of the pro-choice movement triggered by the Supreme
Court's decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., rog S. Ct. 3040 (I g8g). There was
no similar response to the Court's decisions in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (rgSo), which allowed the government to deny poor women public
funding for abortions. The pro-choice movement was relatively complacent about the Court's
effective denial of access to abortions for poor women until the rcproducti\·e rights of affluent
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dressing the concerns of women of color will expand our VISIOn of
reproductive freedom to include the full scope of what it means to
have control over one's reproductive life. 214

VII.

CLAIMING THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY FOR WOMEN OF COLOR

A. Identifying the Constitutional Issue
In deciding which of the competing interests involved in the prosecution of drug-addicted mothers prevails - the state's interest in
protecting the health of the fetus or the woman's interest in preventing
state intervention - it is essential as a matter of constitutional law
to identify the precise nature of the woman's right at stake. In the
Johnson case, the prosecutor framed the constitutional issue as follows:
"What constitutionally protected freedom did Jennifer engage in when
she smoked cocaine ?" 21 5 T hat was the wrong question. Johnson was
not convicted of using drugs. Her "constitutional right" to smoke
cocaine was never at issue. Johnson was prosecuted because she chose
to carry her pregnancy to term while she was addicted to crack. Had
she smoked cocaine during her pregnancy and then had an abortion,
she would not have been charged with such a serious crime . The
proper question, then, is "What constitutionally protected freedom did
Jennifer engage in when she decided to have a baby, even though she
was a drug addict?"
Understanding the prosecution of drug-addicted mothers as punishment for having babies clarifies the constitutional right at stake.
The woman's right at issue is not the right to abuse drugs or to cause
the fetus to be born with defects. 21 6 It is the right to choose to be a
women were also threatened. See Stearns, Roe v. \Vade: Our Struggle Continue s , 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. I, i (1989).
2 14 The struggle for abor ti on rights nevertheless contin ues to play a critical role in advanc in g
wome n 's reproductive a utonomy. Expanding the scope of reprod ucti ve rights beyo nd abortion
to include the right to bear health y children may also help pro-choice advocates in the abo rtion
debate. One of the tactics of the ri ght-to-li fe movement is to characterize the pro-choice
movemen t as people who do not care abo ut children. I participated in a panel discussio n in
which the right-to-life participants brought along a contingent of supporters - all with yo un g
children on their laps. A more complete view of reproductive choice may he lp to dispel this
image . See Colker, R eply to Sarah Bums, 1.3 HARV. WOMEN'S L.]. 207, 212 11.31 (1 99 0l. I do
not, however, advocate tra nsforming reproductive freedom from a women's rights issue into a
children's rights issue. See Burn s, Notes from the Fi eld: A R eply to Professor Calker , 1.3 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 189 , 205-06 (1990).
215 Trial Transcript, supm note 4 at .364
216 Su preme Court pri vacy analys is has similarly misc haracterized the fundament a l right at
iss ue in other contexts. The Court has ty pically iden tified the constitution a l question as whethe r
there is a fundamental right to engage in the conduct forbidd en by the Jaw at iss ue (fo r example ,
aborti on , adultery, contraception, or homosexual acti\·ity). See, e.g . , lVlichael H. v. Gerald D.,
109 S. Ct. 2.3.33, 2.343 (1989) (identifying the ri ght at iss ue as "s pecifically the power of the
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mother that is burdened by the criminalization of conduct during
pregnancy. 217 This view of the constitutional issue reveals the relevance of race to the resolution of the competing interests. Race has
historically determined the value society places on an individual's right
to choose motherhood. Because of the d evaluation of Black motherhood, protecting the right of Black women to choose to bear a child
has unique significance. In the following section, I argue that the
prosecutions of addicted mothers violate traditional liberal notions of
privacy. I also demonstrate how the issue of race informs the traditional analysis and calls for a reassessment of the use of privacy
doctrine in the struggle to eliminate gender and racial subordination.

B. OveYview of PYivacy A yguments

Prosecutions of drug-addicted mothers infringe on two aspects of
the right to individual choice in reproductive decisionmaking. F irst,
they infringe on the freedom to continue a pregnancy that is essential
to an individual's personhood and autonomy. This freedom implies
that state control of the decision to carry a pregnancy to term can be
as pernicious as state control of the decision to terminate a pregnancy.
Second, the prosecutions infringe on choice by imposing an invidious
government standard for the entitlement to procreate. Such imposition of a government standard for childbearing is one way that society
denies the humanity of those who are different. The first approach
emphasizes a woman's right to autonomy over her reproductive life;
the second highlights a woman's right to be valued equally as a human

natural father to assert parental rights over a child born into a woman's existing marriage with
another man"); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) ("The issue presented is whether
the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.").
Jed Rubenfeld has observed that this approach obscures the real danger of laws that abridge
the right of privacy - their use as a means for government to control critical aspects of our
lives and identity. See Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737, 739 (rg8g).
Rubenfeld writes that "[t]he fundament of the right to privacy is not to be found in the supposed
fundamentality of what the law proscribes. It is to be found in what the law imposes." I d.;
see also Tribe & Dorf, supm note r 6o, at 1065-71 (describing the enterprise of designating
fundamental rights as a question of the proper level of abstraction at which to portray those
rights).
217 Ohio Senate Bill No. 324, which would create a new crime of "prenatal child neglect,"
forces drug-addicted mothers to choose between going to jail and giving up their right to bear
children. See S.B. N o. 324, § 2919.22 r (B), II8th Ohio General Assembly, Regular Session
1989-90. A repeat offender must elect either to undergo tubal ligation or to participate in a
five-year contraception program. If she fails to remain drug-free during the five- year program,
the judge must sentence her to be sterilized. See S.B. No. 324 § 2919. 22r (B)(2)(c). If she
refuses to make the required election, she will be held guilty of "aggravated prenatal child
neglect," a first degree felony carrying a possible 25-year prison sentence. S. B. No. 324,
§§ 2919.221(E), 2929.11(B).
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being. 218 In other words, the prosecution of crack-addicted mothers
infringes upon both a mother 's right to make decisions that determine
her individual identity and her right to be respected equally as a
human being by recognizing the value of her motherhood.
Inherent in the thesis of this Article is a tension between the
reliance on the liberal rhetoric of choice and an acknowledgement of
the fallacy of choice for poor women of color. This Article also seeks
to incorporate liberal notions of individual autonomy while acknowledging the coll.ective injury perpetrated by racism. 21 9 This tension
may be an example of what Mari Matsuda calls "multiple consciousness. "220 Professor M atsuda observes that "outsider" lawyers and
scholars must often adopt a "dualist approach" that incorporates an
elitist legal system and the concept of legal rights while seeing the
world from the standpoint of the oppressed. "Unlike the post-modern
critics of the left . . . outsiders, including feminists and people of
color, have embraced legalism as a tool of necessity, making legal
consciousness their own in order to attack injustice. "2 21
This internal struggle between the embrace of legalism and the
recognition of oppression characterizes a process of enlightenment. 222
Working through the privacy analysis from the perspective of poor
Black women uncovers unexplored benefits to be gained from liberal
doctrine while revealing liberalism's inadequacies. This process of
putting forth new propositions for challenge and subversion will produce a better understanding of the law and the ways in which it can
be used to pursue social justice .
C. The R ight to Choose Procreation

Punishin g drug-addicted mothers unconstitutionally burdens the
right to choose to bear a child. Certain interests of the individual 21 8 Both as pects of the con stitu tiona l protection of th e indi vidual's personhood satisfy Martin
Luther King Jr. 's test for th e legitimacy of man-made laws: "A ny la w that uplifts human
personality is just. Any law that degrades human person ality is unjust." M. L. KING, ] R., WHY
WE CAN 'T WAIT 85 (r 963) (Letter from Birmingham J a il); accord West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, supra note 14, at 686- Si.
2 19 Kimberle C renshaw has argued that , alth ough liberal legal ideology has served important
functions in Blacks' strug gle against racial domination , it is important to develop strategies that
minimize the costs of engagin g in legitimating libera l discourse . See C renshaw, supra note 14 ,
at 1384- 8i . She suggests that such strategies must have a community perspective: "History has
shown that the most valuable politic al asset of th e Black community has been its ab ility to
assert a collective identity and to name its collective political reality. Liberal reform discourse
must not be allowed to undermin e the Black collective identity." I d . at r 336.
22 0 Matsuda, When th e FiYst Quail Calls: Mult iple Consciousness as J w·ispmdential Method,
I I WoMEN's RTs. L. REP . 7, 8 (rgSg).
221 ld .
222 S ee Harris, supra note 14, at 584 (discussing th e complex dialogue between th e aspirational voices of li beralism and the voices of real people). For a disc ussion of the importan ce of
as pirational thinking, see Calker, supra note I JO, at JOI 8 -I g.
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called

"ri g hts" -

are

entitled

to

heightened

protection

against government interference under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 223 The right of privacy is recognized as one
cluster of such interests, implicit in the "liberty" that the fourteenth
amendment protects. 224 The right of privacy has been interprete d to
include the "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions . " 22 5 This concept of decisional privacy226 seeks to
protect intimate or personal affairs that are fundamental to an individual's identity and moral personhood from unjustified government
intrusion. 2 2 7

At

the forefront of the development of the

right of

privacy has been the freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life . 22 8 Once an interest has been deemed part of the right
of privacy, the government needs a compelling reason to intervene to
survive constitutional scrutiny. 229
Co nsiderable support exists for the conclusion that the decision to
procreate230 is part of the right of privacy.

The decision to bear

See cases cited infra note 228.
See Roe v. Wade , 410 U.S. rr3, 152- 56 (1973). For a description of the history of
privacy jurisprude nce, see Rubenfeld , supra note 2 r 6, at 740-52.
225 Whalen v. Roe, 42 9 U.S. 589 , 599-6oo (1977).
226 For a discu ssion of the distinction betwee n decisional privacy and privacy in the sense
of restricted access, see Allen, Taking Liberties: Privacy, Private Cho ice, and Social Contract
Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 46r, 463 - 66 (1987). See generally Note, Roe and Paris: Does
Privacy Have a Princ iple ?, 26 STAN . L. REv . rr6r (197 4) (analyzing and defining the concept
of privacy).
227 See L. TRIBE , su pra note r64, § IS-I , at 1302-04 ; Feinberg , Autonomy, Sovere ignty, and
Privacy: Mo m! Ideals in the Constitu tion?, s8 NoTRE DAME L. REv . 445, 446-67 (1983);
Ge rety, Redefin ing Privacy , 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 236 (1977) (defining privacy as
"an autonomy or control over the intimacies of personal identity"); Henkin , Privacy and Autonomy, 74 CoLUM. L. REV. I4ro, 1412- 29 (1974). For the classic liberal defense of perso nal
a uton omy, see }. S. MILL , ON LIBERTY 77-79 (G. Himmerfaub ed . 1974) (Ist ed. I859).
22s S ee , e.g. , Roe v. Wade , 4IO U.S. II 3 (1973) (right to choose whether to terminate a
pregnancy); Lov ing v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967) (right to choose one's spouse); Griswold v.
Connectic ut, 381 U.S . 479, 485 (I96S) (right to decide whether to use contraceptives); Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S . 535 (1942 ) (ri ght to procreate) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U .S. 510
(1925 ) (right to select the sc hooling of children under one's co ntrol ); Meyer v. Ne braska, 262
U .S. 390 (1923) (right to dete rmine the lang uage taught to one's children).
229 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at ISS ·
23 J Exploring the contours of the right to procreate is beyond the scope of this Article. I
focu s on the aspect of the ri ght of privacy that gua rantees the choice to carry a pregnancy to
term. I want to protect the individual from punishment for makin g a reproductive decision
rather than to ful fi ll the individual's des ire to have children. The value at th e heart of my
argum ent is not procreation , but autonomy. See L. TRIB E, supra note 164, § 15-23 , at 1423
("As the Court itself stressed in Carey, the constitutional pri nciple of 'indi vid ual autonomy'
affirmed in these cases protected not proc reation, but th e individual 's 'right of decision' abo ut
procreation." (quotin g Carey v. Popul atio n Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 6i8 , 68i-8 9 (1977)) (emphasis
in original)).
Delineating the right to proc reate is difficult indeed. It involves defi nin g the procreative
ac tivi ties encomp assed by the right , as well as the limits on government interference with those
activities . N ew developments in reproductive tec hnology have complicated the problem by
22.3
22

4

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

children is universally acknowledged in the privacy cases as being "at
the very heart" of these constitutionally protected choices. 231 In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 232 for example, the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute that prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried persons. Although the case was decided on equal protection grounds, the Court recognized the vital nature of the freedom to
choose whether to give birth to a child: "If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child. "233
The right of privacy protects equally the choice to bear children
and the choice to refrain from bearing them. 234 The historical experiences of Black women illustrate the evil of government control over
procreative decisions. Their experiences demonstrate that the dual
allowing people to procreate in ways current law does not contemplate. See, e.g., Andrews,
Alternative Modes of Reproduction , in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990s, supra note rzs,
at 259; Developments in the Law - Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REv.
1519, 1525-56 (199o); Special Project: Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding Conception, Pregnancy, and Birth, 39 VAND. L. REV. 597, 602-52 (1986). For discussions of the right to
procreate, see Binion, Reproductive Freedom and the Constitution: The Limits on Choice, 4
BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 12, 24-39 (1989); Robertson, supra note 13, at 405-20; and Scott,
Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights and Family Privacy, 1986
DUKE L.J. 8o6, 827-33.
231 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977). Although dicta in many of
the privacy decisions include the decision to bear a child among those protected by the right of
privacy, the holdings of the cases concern the freedom not to procreate - the right to avoid
unwanted pregnancy tLrough contraception or abortion. See Carey, 43 r U.S. at 694 (holding
that a state law limiting minors' access to contraceptives violated fourteenth amendment); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. I13, I53 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (r<J72) (striking down
a state law limiting unmarried people's access to contraceptives), Griswold v. Connecticut, 38 I
U.S. 479, 485 (I965). By contrast, the Supreme Court has hardly addressed the right to bear
a child. Its only decision upholding the right to procreate is Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942). See infra pp. I475-76.
2 3 2 405 U.S. 438 (I972).
2 33 I d. at 453 (emphasis omitted).
234 Support for the right to procreate can be found in the language of Roe v. \Vade, in which
the Court held that the constitutional "right of privacy
is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 410 U.S. at 153 (emphasis
added). The Court made the woman's choice - either to terminate her pregnancy or complete
it - the crux of the privacy right it recognized. Because it is the woman's choice that is
guaranteed, the alternative to the abortion decision - the decision to carry the fetus to term
- must also be protected. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 778 n.6 (Ig86) (Stevens, ]., concurring); L. TRIBE, supra note r64, § ISIO, at IJ40 (arguing that the meaning of the privacy cases is that "whether one person's body
shall be the source of another life must be left to that person and that person alone to decide")
(emphasis omitted); cf. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn
from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REv. I, 14 ( r g8g) (noting the difficulty in justifying any
constitutional distinction between "the state's power to require an abortion in certain circumstances and the state's power to forbid one" (emphasis in original)).
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nature of the decisional right recognized in the privacy cases goes
beyond the logical implications of making a choice. The exploitation
of Black women's foremothers during slavery to breed more slaves
and the sterilization abuse that they have suffered reveal society's
pervasive devaluation of Black women as mothers.
Burdening both the right to terminate a pregnancy and the right
to give birth to a child violates a woman's personhood by denying her
autonomy over the self-defining decision of whether she will bring
another being into the world. Furthermore, criminalizing the choice
to give birth imposes tangible burdens on women, as well as the
intangible infringement on personhood. Punishing women for having
babies is in this sense at least as pernicious as forced maternity at the
behest of the state. 235
If a woman's decision to bear a child is entitled to constitutional
protection, it follows that the government may not unduly burden
that choice. In Cleveland BoaYd of Education v. LaFleuY, 236 the Court
invalidated mandatory maternity leave policies that had the effect of
burdening the choice to procreate. The Court viewed the school
board's policy of forced maternity leave as a form of penalty imposed
on pregnant teachers for asserting their right to decide to have children. 23 7 Although the Court applied a rational basis test to the maternity leave policies in LaP leuY, 238 the more drastic burden of criminal punishment should warrant strict scrutiny. 23 9 Even under the

l35 But see Rubenfeld, mpra note 2 r6, at 796-97 (argu in g that iaws limiting family size and
laws prohibiting abortion are "enormously differe nt in their real, material effect o n individuals'
Jives" and cautionin g against being "misled by their formal similarities") . Ruben fe ld finds that,
al thou gh both laws impinge o n t he child-bearing decision , a law th at in effect requires women
to bear children takes over women's liv es far more than a law that forb ids them from having
more than a prescrib ed numb e r of children. Se e id. at 797 ; see also R. PETCHESKY, ABORTION
AND WOMA:-<'s CHOICE 387- 90 (r984) (criticizin g the a ssumption of "a mistaken symmetry
between 'the right to have children ' a nd 'the right ... not to have them"'). Petchesky postulates
that in a society whe re gender, class, and racial eq uality have been ach ieved, the state might
be justified in denying individuals a right to procreate. Unlike Pctchesky, I have endeavored
to analyze the pol itical implication s of t he punis hment of drug-addicted mothers only in the
co ntext of the current and hi sto rical conditions of ge nder, class, and racial inequality. Petchesky
presents just such a n analysis of abortion. See id. a t 12 -13. Rubenfeld also m ay have reac hed
a diffe rent co n clusion if he had considered the real, materi a l effects on women of color created
by the state's interfe rence in the decisio n to procrea te. Of course, the co nsequen ces of compelling
childbirth and of prohibitin g it are not identical, and the gov ernment 's asserted justifications
for intervention are not al ways of equa l weight.
236

414 U. S. 632 (1974).
S ee McN ulty, Si!pra note 8 , at 315; Note, supra note 8 , at 618.
!.lS LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 639-48.
239 U nder Roe v. Wade , law·s allowing the prosec ution of dr ug-addicted mothers would have
to m ee t a strict scrutin y test. As the Court stated in Roe, "(W]here certain 'fundamental ri g hts'
are in-; o lved, the Co urt has held th at regulat io n limiting these righ ts may be justified only by
a 'com pelling state interest,' and that legislati\·e enact men ts must be narro wly drawn to express
on ly the le gitimate state interests at st a ke." 410 U.S . at r 13 (c itation s omitted). I ha,:e a lread y
237
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Court's current analysis, which distinguishes between direct and indirect governmental interference in reproductive decisionmaking, 24 0
government intrusion as extreme as criminal prosecution would unduly
infringe on protected autonomy. 241 The Court has expressly distinguished , for example , the government's refusal to subsidize the exercise of the abortion right from the infliction of criminal penalties on
the exercise of that right. 242 Criminal prosecutions of drug-addicted
mothers do more than discourage a choice; they exact a severe penalty
on the drug user for choosing to complete her pregnancy.
These privacy concepts have two benefits for advocating the reproductive rights of women of color in particular: the right of privacy
stresses the value of personhood, and it protects against the totalitarian
abuse of government power. First, affirming Black women's constitutional claim to personhood is particularly important because these
women historically have been denied the dignity of their full humanity
and identity. 243 The principle of self-definition has special significance
demonstrated that laws punishing drug-addicted mothers do not meet this test. See supra notes
190-192 and accompanying text.
24 0 In upholding the denial of public funding for abortions, the Court distinguished between
a direct governmental burden on the exercise of reprodu ctive choice and the government's
refusal to subsidize one choice, abortion, while subsidizin g th e alternative, childbirth. See
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 305 r- 53 (1989); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 314-18 (r98o); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 - 77 (1977). See generally Appleton,
Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contributions of the Abortion-Funding Cases
to Fundamental-Rights Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights Th es is, 8r CoLUM. L. REv. 72 r ,
724-45 (1981) (arguing that after i'vfaher, state action will o nl y face strict sc rutin y if it is an
"impingement" on a fundamental right).
24! The Court has struck down state regulations of abortion that so restricted women's access
to abortion that they effectively denied women a choice. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Ame ri can
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 4 76 U.S. 74 7, 759-71 ( 1986) (striking down informed
conse nt , reporting, and standard-of-care requirements for post-viability abortions); City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 431 - 52 (r983) (striking down
provisions of ordinance requiring parental consent, informed consent, 24-hour waiting period,
performance of all second-trimester abortions in a hospital, and ''humane and sanitary" disposal
of fetal remains); Colautti v. Franklin , 439 U.S. 379, 389- 401 (1979) (striking down viabilitydetermination and standard-of- care req uirements as vague); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth ,
428 U.S. 52 , 69-75 (1976) (stri kin g down, inter alia, spousal and parental consent requirements).
242 See Colautti , 439 U.S. at 386 n .7 (describing criminal penalties as a "direct obstacle" to
rep rodu ctive choice to be distinguished from denial of funding); I'daher, 432 U.S. at 474 n. 8.
243 Patricia Williams has explored the differing perspectives on "rights" held by Blacks and
whites - in this case the predominantly white critical legal st udies movement. She explains
that, for Blacks, the stereotyping of human experience created by ri gh ts discourse (the focus of
the critical legal studies critique) is a lesser historical evil than ha ving been ignored altogether.
See Williams, A !chemical Notes: Reconstmcting I deals from Deconstructed Rights, 2 2 HARV.
C.R. -C.L. L. REv. 401 , 414 (1987) ("The black experience of a non ymity, the estrangement of
being without a name, has been one of li ving in the obli v ion of soc iety's inverse , beyo nd the
dimension of any co nsideration at a ll. Thus , the experience of rights-assertion
has been a
process of finding th e self. ") Sim il a rl y, Kimberle Crenshaw observes that dispossessed peo ple
use rights rhetoric "to redeem some of the rhetorical promises" of popu lar political discourse by
fo rcing society to live up to its deepest commitments. See Cren shaw, supra note 14, at 1366.
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for Black women. Angela Harris recognizes in the writings of Zora
Neale Hurston an insistence on a "conception of identity as a construction, not an essence . . . . [B]lack women have had to learn to
construct themselves in a society that denied them full selves. "2 4 4
Black women's willful self-definition is an adaptation to a history of
social denigration. Rejected from the dominant society's norm of
womanhood , Black women have been forced to resort to their own
internal resources. Harris contrasts this process of affirmative selfdefinition with the feminist paradigm of women as passive victims.
Black women willfully create their own iden tities out of "fragments
of experience, not discovered in one's body or unveiled after male
domination is eliminated. "245
The concept of personhood embodied in the right of privacy can
be used to affirm the role of will and creativity in Black women's
construction of their own identities . Relying on the concept of selfdefinition celebrates the legacy of Black women who have survived
and transcended conditions of oppression. 24 6 T he process of defining
one's self and declaring one's personhood defies the denial of selfownership inherent in slavery. 247 T hus , th e right of privacy, with its
affirmation of personhood, is especially suited for challenging the
devaluation of Black motherhood underlyin g the prosecutions of drugaddicted women.
Another important element of the right of privacy is its delineation
of the limits of governmental power. 248 T he protection from government abuse also makes the right of privacy a useful legal tool for
protecting the reproductive rights of women of color. 24 9 Poor women
244

H arr is, supra note 14, a t 6r3 (c iting Hurs ton , How It Feels to Be Colored Me, in I LOVE
MYSE LF WHEN I AM LAUGHING
A ND THEN AGAIN WHEN I AM LOOKING MEAN AND
IMPRESSIVE 152, 155 (A. W alker ed. 1979)).
245 !d.
246 For exa mpl es of Black wome n who have t ra n sce nded co nditi ons of op pression. see L.
HUTC HI NSON, ANNA ]. COOPER: A VOICE FROM THE SOUTH (198 1); and ]. ROBINSO N, THE
MONTGOMERY Bus BOYCOTT AND THE WOM EN WHO STARTED IT: THE MEMOI R OF ] 0 ANN
GIBSON ROBI NSON (1 987). The fictional writings of Black women also exp ress this traditi on.
See, e.g ., T. MORRISON, BELOVED (1987); A. WALKER, THE COLOR PURPLE (1982) .
2 4 7 See A llen, supra no te 103, a t 141.
248 Rubenfeld, fo r exampl e, pro poses an interpretation of th e right of p rivacy that focu ses
on the affirmative conseq uences of laws challenged on the basis of p ri vacy claims. See Rub enfeld, supra note 216, at 782 - 84 . It is th e "totalitarian" in terve ntion of gove rnment into a
pe rso n's life that the right of privacy protects against. Id. at 787 . The ri ght of privac y, th en,
m ean s "the right not to have the course of one's life dictated by t he state." I d. at 807.
24 9 P rotection fro m government powe r need not be t he full exten t of th e Constitution's
guara ntee of autonomy a n d personhood. See infra pp. I4 78 - 80. Recog ni zing th at "[a ]s long as
a state exists and enforce s any laws at all, it ma kes political choices, " Fra nces Olsen a rg ues
th at the dis t in ctio n between state intervention a nd nonintervention is a myth . O lse n, The Myth
of State ! nteYwntion in the Family, r8 U. M ICH. J.L. REF. 835, 836 (1985). Olsen furth er
arg ues t hat the poor have the least to gai n from the rhetoric of noninterve ntion: "The a ttempt
to criticize state ' inte rve ntion ' instead oi criti cizi ng th e particular policies pu rsued may be
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of color are especially vulnerable to government control over their
decisions. 250 The government's pervasive involvement in Black women's lives illustrates the inadequacy of the privacy critique presented
by some white feminist scholars. 2 5 1 Catharine MacKinnon, for example, argues that privacy doctrine is based on the false liberal assumption that government nonintervention into the private sphere
promotes women's autonomy. 252 The individual woman's legal right
of privacy, according to MacKinnon, functions instead as "a means
of subordinating women's collective needs to the imperatives of male
supremacy. "253
This rejection of privacy doctrine does not take into account the
contradictory meaning of the private sphere for women of color. Feminist legal theory focuses on the private realm of the family as an
institution of violence and subordination. 254 Women of color, howespecially limiting for poor people, who often have to rely on various government programs and
are thus less likely to benefit from any political strategy based on the myth of nonintervention."
ld. at 863.
250 See supra pp. 1432-34 .
2 5 1 Some feminist scholars have argued that a gender equality approach to reproductive
freedom advances women 's rights better than a privacy rationale. See, e.g., Copelan, Unpacking
Patriarchy: Reprodu ction, Sexuality, Originalism, and Constitutional Change, in A LESS THAN
PERFECT UNION: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 303, 322-26 (J.
Lobel ed. 1988); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution , 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 , 1016-28
(1984); MacKinnon , Roe v. Wade : A Study in Male Id eology, in ABORTIOi'l: MORAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 45 (J. Garfield & P. Hennessey eds. 1984).
For a dialogue concerning the usc of equality doctrine versus privacy doctrin e to advocate
abortion rights, see Calker, Feminist Litigation: An Oxymoron? - A Study of the Briefs Filed
in William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 13 HARV. WoMEN 's L.]. 137 (1990);
Burns, Notes from the Field: A Reply t.o Professor Calker, 13 HARV. WoMEN's L.J. 189 (1990);
and Colker, Reply to Sarah Burns, 13 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 207 (1990). In her response to
Ruth Calker's criticism of the emphasis on privacy doctrine in feminist litigation, Sarah Burns
rais es several important questions:
Why should we not insist that the question whe th er to have an abortion is a woman's
private moral decision outside the public realm a nd beyond public interference? Wh y is
arguing for equality necessarily more ' radical' and less 'liberally co-opted' than arguing
for fundamenta l liberty and autonomy for women? Are not equality concepts co-opted
by liberal interpretation? Can equality work as a concept with out the concepts of liberty
and auto nomy?
Burns, supra , at 193. I attempt to answer some of these questions in this Article , especially as
they relate to women of colo<. For a defe nse of privacy that responds to the feminist cri tique,
see A. ALLEN, :;upra note r6o, at 57 (arg uing that the "solution to the privacy problem women
fac e begins with promoting greater em phasis on opportunities for individual form s of privacy,
rather than in rej ecting privacy"); and Olsen, The Suprem e Court, 1988 Term - Comment:
Unrav eling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REV. ros , 1 ! 7 (I989) (arguin g the importance of extending privacy doctrine equal ly to women and men, "even as we pursue efforts to dismantle
the fa.l se dichotomies underlying it").
252 See MacKinnon, supra note 25 1, at SI-53253 !d. at 49254 "[T]he legal concept of pri vacy can and has shielded the place of battery, marital rape,
and wome n's exploited la bor ; has preserved the central institutions whereby women are depYi<-•ed
of identity, a utonomy. con trol and self-definition ; a nd has pro tected the primary activity through
whi ch male supremacy is ex wessed and enforced." !J. at 53 (e mph as is in origin al).
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ever, often experience the family as the site of solace and resistance
against racial oppression. ZS5 For many women of color, the immediate
concern in the area of reproductive rights is not abuse in the pr,ivate
sphere, but abuse of government power. The prosecution of crackaddicted mothers and coerced sterilization are examples of state intervention that pose a much greater threat for women of color than for
white women.
Another telling example is the issue of child custody. The primary
concern for white middle-class women with regard to child custody is
private custody battles with their husbands following the termination
of a marriage. 256 But for women of color, the dominant threat is
termination of parental rights by the state. 257 Again, the imminent
danger faced by poor women of color comes from the public sphere,
not the private. Thus, the protection from government interference
that privacy doctrine affords may have a different significance for
women of color.

D. Unconstitutional Government StandaYds joy Procreation:
The Inters ec tion of PYivacy and Equality
The equal protection clause and the right of privacy provide the
basis for two separate constitutional challenges to the prosecution of
drug-addicted mothers. The singling out of Black mothers for punishment combines in a single government action several wrongs prohibited by both constitutional doctrines. Black mothers are denied
autonomy over procreative decisions because of their race. The government's denial of Black women's fundamental right to choose to
bear children serves to perpetuate the legacy of racial discrimination
embodied in the devaluation of Black motherhood. T he full scope of
the government's violation can better be understood, then, by a constitutional theory that acknowledges the complementary and overlapping qualities of the Constitution's guarantees of equality and privacy. 258 Viewing the prosecutions as imposing a racist government
standard for procreation uses this approach. 2 59
255

See J o nes, supra note 108, at 237; Kline , supra no te I7, at 122 - 23. Patric ia Cain observes
th at lesbia ns' expe riences of th e private sphere may also differ from l'/1acKinnon's description:
"lesbians who live our private lives removed from the intima te p-rese nce of men do indeed
ex peri ence time free from male domination. W hen we leave the male-dominated pubiic sph c:re,
we co me home to a woman-ident ified private sphere." Cain , supra note 21, at 2 r 2.
256 See Kline, supra note 17. at I2 g.
25i See id . at r28-3r (criticizing a feminist a nalysis of child custody law that ne glects the
experiences of Black and Native American wo men ); supra notes rog-r r 5 an d accompanying
text.
158 See L. TRIBE , suPra note 164, § 16-g, at q.)8-6o (discussing the intersection of "preferred
rights" and "equality of ri ghts") .
259 The issue of t he constitutionality of a gover!1ment standard for procreatio n ;·aises the
q uestion of whet her the ri ght to proc reate is limited and therefore implie s certaiP. requirements
for entitlement. Eliz2.beth Scott . for example, defines the right to proueatc as "the ri ght to
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Poor crack addicts are punished for having babies because they
fail to measure up to the state's ideal of motherhood. Prosecutors have
brought charges against women who use drugs during pregnancy
without demonstrating any harm to the fetus. 26° Moreover, a government policy that has the effect of punishing primarily poor Black
women for having babies evokes the specter of racial eugenics, especially in light of the history of sterilization abuse of women of color. 2 61
These factors make clear that these women are not punished simply
because they may harm their unborn children. They are punished
because the combination of their poverty, race, and drug addiction is
seen to make them unworthy of procreating.
This aspect of the prosecutions implicates both equality and privacy interests. The right to bear children goes to the heart of what
it means to be human. The value we place on individuals determines
whether we see them as entitled to perpetuate themselves in their
children. Denying someone the right to bear children - or punishing
her for exercising that right - deprives her of a basic part of her
humanity. 262 When this denial is based on race, it also functions to
preserve a racial hierarchy that essentially disregards Black humanity.
produce one's own children to rear." Scott, supra note 230, at 829. She argues that constitutional
protection extends only to the reproductive interests of prospective rearing parents, because it
is the objective of rearing the child that elevates the interest in procreation to the status of a
fundamental right. The right to procreate, therefore, "requires an intention as well as an ability
to assume the role of parent." I d. Thus, a retarded person who is "so severely and irremediably
impaired that she could never provide a child with minimally adequate care . .
has no
[constitutionally] protectab le interes t in proc reation." /d. at 833. The irremediable nature of the
retarded person's impairment distinguishes her from a drug addict who is judged to be an unfit
parent. Cf. id. at 833 n .g r (distin guishin g o n the basis of irremediability retarded people from
tho se who have previously failed at parenting).
260 In the Johnson trial, for example, the prosecution introduced no evidence that Johnson 's
children were adversely affected by their mother's crack use. Indeed, there was testimony that
the children were healthy and d evelopin g normally. See Trial Transcript, supra note 4, at 4647 , 120 (testimony of Dr. Randy T omp kin a nd Clarice Johnso n, Jennifer's mother). A law
proposed in Ohio makes drug use during pregnancy grounds for sterilization. S ee supra note
2 r 7.
Similarly, several states have enacted statutes that make a woman's dru g use during
pregnancy by itself grounds to depri ve h er of custody of her child. Se e supra note so.
26 ! See supra pp. 1442-43.
262 See Karst , supra note r6r , a t 32; Stefan, Who se Egg I s It Anyway ? Reprodu ctive Rights
of Incarcerated , Institu tionali zed an d Incompetent Women, 13 N OVA L. REv. 405 , 454 (1989)
(discussing th e systematic barriers to moth erhood imposed on incarcerated women as a part of
th e process of dehumanization); see also Asch, R eproductive Technology and Disability, in
REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE rggos, supra note 125 , at ro6-07 (discussi ng the importance of
the right to choose childbearing for disabled wo men ).
I recognize that th ere are women who choose not to have children or are incapable of havin g
children and that this choice or in a bility d oes not m a ke them any less human. Se e C ain, supra
note 2 I , at 201, 205 n . 96 (criticizing feminist disc ourse th at pri v ileges the experience of motherhood over other experiences of female co nnection). It is not the ac t of h aving children that
makes an individual fully human ; it is society's vie w of whether she deserv es to hav e children.
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The abuse of sterilization laws designed to effect eugenic policy
demonstrates the potential danger of governmental standards for procreation. During the first half of the twentieth century, the eugenics
movement 263 embraced the theory 264 that intelligence and other personality traits are genetically determined and therefore inherited. This
hereditarian belief, coupled with the reform approach of the progressive era, fueled a campaign to remedy America's social problems by
stemming biological degeneracy. Eugenicists advocated compulsory
sterilization to prevent reproduction by people who were likely to
produce allegedly defective offspring. Eugenic sterilization was
thought to improve society by eliminating its "socially inadequate"
members. 265 Many states around the turn of the century enacted
involuntary sterilization laws directed at those deemed burdens on
society, including the mentally retarded, mentally ill, epileptics, and
criminals. 266
In a r 92 7 decision, Buck v. Bell, 2 6 7 the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality 268 of a Virginia involuntary sterilization
26 3 For a disc ussion of the eugenic sterilization movement in the early twentieth century, see
B urgdorf & Burgdorf, Th e Wicked Witch Is Almost D ead: Buck v. Bell and the Sterilization
of Handicapped Persons, so TEMP. L.Q. 995, 997-1005 (1977); and Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt
Necessities" v. Fundamental Values? , 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 1418, 1425-35 (1981). George P.
Smith II has presented a contemporary justification of euge nic sterilization of the mentally
handicapped. Se e Smith, Limitations on Reprodu ctive Autonomy for th e Mentally Handicapped,
4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 7I, 72, 88-89 (rg88).
The discrediting of eugenic theory, th e de ve lopment of the constitutional doctrine of reproductive auto nomy, a nd the changing view of menta l retardation have all spurred a major reform
of sterili za tion law in the last two decades. Repo rts of Nazi Germany's program of racial
eugenics achieved through widespread sterilization precipitated the modern rej ection of these
laws. S ee Scott, supra note 230, at Srr-12.
2 64 For a description of th e origins of eugeni c th eo ry, see Cynkar, supra note 263, at 142025.
2 6 5 O ne report writte n by a leadin g sc holar of the eugenic movement defin ed the "socially
inadequate" as:
"(r) feeble-minded; (2) insane (including the psychopathic); (3) criminalistic (including th e
delinqu ent and wayward); (4) epil eptic; (5) inebriate (including dru g- habitues) ; (6) diseased
(including the tuberc ul ous, the syphilitic, the lepro us , and others with chronic , infectious
and legally segregable diseases); (7) blind (includin g those with seriously impaired vision);
(8) deaf (includin g those with seriously imp aired he a rin g) ; (g) deformed (including the
crippled); and (ro) depend ent (including orph ans , ne'er-do-wells, the homeless, tramps
and paupers) . •·

Cynkar, sup ra note 263, at 1428 (quoting H. LA UG HLIN , THE LEGA L STATUS OF EUGENICAL
STERILIZATION 65 (1929)).
266 As late as rg66, 26 states still had eugeni c sterilization laws. See Scott, supra note 23 0,
at 8og n . I I. It has been estimated th at over jo ,ooo perso ns were in vo luntarily sterilized under
these statutes . See Smith, supra note 263, at 77 n 35. For a d isc ussion of the eugenic sterilization
statutes, see Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit - I s S terilization the Answer?, 27 OHIO ST. L.J.
59 1 (1966).
267 274 U .S. zoo (1927).
268 The Court rejected a rguments that the Virginia sterilization law violated the equal
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law. 26 9 The plaintiff, Carrie Buck, was described m the opinion as
"a feeble minded white woman" committed to a state mental institution who was "the daughter of a feeble minded mother in the same
institution, and the mother of an illegitimate feeble minded child. "2 70
The Court approved an order of the mental institution that Buck
undergo sterilization . Justice Holmes, himself an ardent eugenicist, 2 71
gave eugenic theory the imprimatur of constitutional law in his infamous declaration: "Three generations of imbeciles are enough. "2 72
T he salient feature of the euge nic sterilization laws is their brutal
imposition of society's restrictive norms of motherhood. Governmental
control of reproduction in the name of science masks racist and classist
judgments about who deserves to bear children. It is grounded on
the premise that people who depa rt from social norms do not deserve
to procreate . 27 3 Carrie B uck, for example, was punished by sterilization not because of any mental disability, but because of her deviance
from society's so cial and sexual norms. 27 4
protection clause because it a pplied onl y to in stitutionalized perso ns and th a t it violated the due
process clause becau se it exceeded the legitimate power of th e state. See id. at 20 7- 08.
The continued a uthority of Bu ck v. B ell is highly do ubtful in light of the deve lop ment of
reprod uctive privacy doctrine in the last 30 years. Because ste rili zation laws infringe w h at is
now acknowledged as a fundamental right, they a re subject to strict scrutiny rather than the
rational-basis a nalysis applied in Bell. See M urdock, Sterilizat ion of the R etard ed: A Problem
or a S olution ?, 62 CALI F. L. REv. 917, 921-24 (1974); Sherlock & Sherlock , Sterilizing the
Retarded: Constitutional, Statutory and Policy Alternatives, 6o N.C.L. REv. 943 , 953- 54 (1982).
2 6 9 1924 Va. Acts 394 . For a disc ussion of the histo ry of the Virginia sterilization law 's
enactment , see Lombardo , Three Ge nerati ons, No I mbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell , 6o
N.Y.U. L. REv. 30, 34-48 ( rg 8sl
2iO Bell, 2 74 U.S. a: 205. Subsequ en t researc h has revealed that the Court's fac tual statement
was erroneo us. Altho ugh Carri e B uck became pregnant out of wedlock, the find in g that she
was "feeble minded" was based on insubs tant ia l testimony. See Go ul d, Carri .: Buck's Daughte r,
2 CONST. COMMENTARY 331, 336 ( 1985); Lombardo, supra note 269, at 52.
2ii See H olmes , I de als an d Doubts, ro I LL. L. REv. r, 3 (r915) ("I believe t hat the wholesale
social rege neration
. can not be affec ted app rec iably by tin keri ng w ith the institution of
property, but only by taking in han d life a nd trying to bu ild a race ."); Rogat, Mr. Justi ce
Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN. L. REV. 254, 282 ( r 963) (refe rrin g to Buck v. Bell as
"a judicial m an ifes tation of [Holmes's] intense eugenicist vic:ws").
27 2 Bell, 27 4 U.S. at 207.
2i 3 The distinction I make be twee n puni tive a nd euge ni c motive do es not dep end on the
specifi c provisions of the statute. but on th e moralistic versus biological impulse und erl yin g the
statute . Com pulsor y steril ization laws - whether crimi nal or the rape uti c - 1vere often based
on punitive motivations disg uised as a eugenic rationale. See R. PETCHESKY, supra note 235 ,
at 8 5. Petchesky asserts that th e steril ization laws were puni tive beca use "[t]heir aim was not
only to reduc e numbers or root out 'defective genes' but also to attack and p unish sexual
'promiscuity' an d th e sexual dan ge r th ought to emanate from the lower classes , especially lo werclass wome n. " !d. at 88. My fo cus is on th e statutes' punishment of dev iance from the standard
for motherhood rathe r th a n for sex ual dev iance alor.e.
2i 4 Apparently, Carri e was ste rili zed beca use she was poor and had been pregnant out of
wed lock. See Lomba rdo , supra note 269, at 5 r . The depos ition testimony of the state ment al
institution's trial expert , the famed eugenicist Harry La ughli n, implies this underlying motivation: "These peo pl e belong to the shiftless, ignorant , and '.Vorthless ciass of anti -soc ial VV'hites of
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Explanations of the eugenic rationale reveal this underlying moral
standard for procreation. One eugenicist, for example, justified his
extreme approach of putting the socially inadequate to death as "'the
surest, the simplest, the kindest, and most humane means for preventing reproduction among those whom we deem unworthy of the
high privilege. '" 275 Dr. Albert Priddy, the superintendent of the Virginia Colony, similarly explained the necessity of eugenic sterilization
in one of his annual reports: the '"sexual immorality' of 'anti-social'
'morons' rendered them 'wholly unfit for exercising the right of motherhood. "' 276
Fourteen years after Buck v. Bell, the Court acknowledged the
danger of the eugenic rationale. Justice Douglas recognized both the
fundamental quality of the right to procreate and its connection to
equality in a later sterilization decision, Skinner v. Oklahoma. 2 77
Skinner considered the constitutionality of the Oklahoma Habitual
Criminal Sterilization Act 278 authorizing the sterilization of persons
convicted two or more times for "felonies involving moral turpitude. "279 An Okla homa court had ordered Skinner to u!1dergo a
vasectomy after he was convicted once of stealing chickens and twice
of robbery with firearms. 280 The statute, the Court found, treated
unequally criminals who had committed intrinsically the same quality
of offense. For example, men who had committed grand larceny three
times were sterilized, but embezzlers were not. The Court struck
down the statute as a violation of the equal protection
clause. Declaring the right to bear children to be "one of the basic
civil rights of man, "281 the Court applied strict scrutiny to the
classification 282 and held that the government failed to demonstrate
that the statute's classifications were justified by eugenics or the inheritability of criminal traits. 283
Sl<-inner rested on grounds that linked equal protection doctrine
and the right to procreate. Justice Douglas framed the legal question
as "a sensitive and important area of human rights. "284 The reason
the South." I d. After reviewing the record of the case, Professor Gould concluded: "Her case
never was about mental deficiency; it was always a matter of sexual morality and social
deviance. .
Two generations of bastards are enough." Gould, supm note 2 70, at 336.
275 M. HALLER , EUGENICS: HEREDITARIAN ATTITUDES 1:--1 AMERICAN THOUGHT 42 (1963)
(quoting eugenicist W. Dunca n M cKim) (emphasis added).
276 Lombardo, supra note 269, at 46 (quoting REPORT OF THE VIRGINIA STATE EPILEPTIC
CoLONY 27 (1922-23)) (emphasis added).
277

316 U.S. 535 (1942).
27 8 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ I?I-I95 (\Nest 1935).
279 /d. § I/J.

lSO

See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 537·

281

ld. at 54I.

28 2

See id. at 541.
See id. at 542.
l d. a.t 536 (emphasis added).

283

204

T he right of procreation is also considered a human right
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for the Court's elevation of the right to procreate was the Court's
recognition of the significant risk of discriminatory selection inherent
in state intervention in reproduction. 285 The Court also understood
the genocidal implications of a government standard for procreation:
"In evil or reckless hands [the government's power to sterilize] can
cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to
wither and disappear. "286 The critical role of procreation to human
survival and the invidious potential for government discrimination
against disfavored groups makes heightened protection crucial. The
Court understood the use of the power to sterilize in the government's
discrimination against certain types of criminals to be as invidious "as
if it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment. "287
Although the reasons advanced for the sterilization of chicken
thieves and the prosecution of drug-addicted mothers are different,
both practices are dangerous for similar reasons. Both effectuate
ethnocentric judgments by the government that certain members of
society do not deserve to have children. As the Court recognized in
Skinner, the enforcement of a government standard for childbearing
denies the disfavored group a critical aspect of human dignity. 288
The history of compulsory sterilization demonstrates that society
deems women who deviate from its norms of motherhood- in 1941,
teenaged delinquent girls like Carrie Buck who bore illegitimate children, today, poor Black crack addicts who use drugs during pregnancy
-"unworthy of the high privilege" of procreation. 2 89 The government
therefore refuses to affirm their human dignity by helping them overcome obstacles to good mothering. 2 90 Rather, it punishes them by
sterilization or criminal prosecution and thereby denies them a basic
part of their humanity. When this denial is based on race, the violation is especially serious . Governmental policies that perpetuate
racial subordination through the denial of procreative rights, which
threaten both racial equality and privacy at once, should be subject
to the highest scrutiny.

E. Toward a Ne w Privacy Jurisprudence
Imagine that courts and legislatures have accepted the argument
th a t the p rosecution of crack-addicted mothers violates their right of
under international law. Se e Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 16 § r, G.A. Res.
21 7 (III ), at 74, U.N . Doc. A/8ro (1948) ("Men an d women of full age, without any limitation
d ue to race, nationality or reli gion , have the right to marr y and to found a famil y.").
28 5 See L. TRIBE , supra note r64, § rs-ro, at 133 9, § 16-12, at 1464.
285 Ski nner, 316 U.S. at 54 1.
28i / d .
288 See id.
28 9 See supra note 275 and ac companying text.
290 See supra notes pp. 1448- s o.
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privacy. All pending indictments for drug use during pregnancy are
dismissed and bills proposing fetal abuse laws are discarded. Would
there be any perceptible change in the inferior status of Black women?
Pregnant crack addicts would still be denied treatment, and most poor
Black women would continue to receive inadequate prenatal care .
The infant mortality rate for Blacks would remain deplorably high.
In spite of the benefits of privacy doctrine for women of color, liberal
notions of privacy are inadequate to eliminate the subordination of
Black women. In this section, I will suggest two approaches that I
believe are necessary in order for privacy theory to contribute to the
eradication of racial hierarchy. First, we need to develop a positive
view of the right of privacy. Second, the law must recognize the
connection between the right of privacy and racial equality.
The most compelling argument against privacy rhetoric, from the
perspective of women of color, is the connection that feminist scholars
have drawn
between privacy and the abortion funding
2
1
decisions. 9 Critics of the concept of privacy note that framing the
abortion right as a right merely to be shielded from state intrusion
into private choices provides no basis for a constitutional claim to
public support for abortions. As the Court explained in Harris v.
J11cRae, 2 9 2 "although government may not place obstacles in the path
of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove
those not of its own creation. "293 MacKinnon concludes that abortion
as a private privilege rather than a public right only serves to perpetuate inequality:
Privacy conceived as a right from public intervention and disclosure
is the opposite of the relief that Harris sought for welfare women.
State intervention would have provided a choice women did not have
in [the] private [realm]. T he women in Harris, women whose sexual
refusal has counted for particularly little, needed something to make
their privacy effective. The logic of the Court's response resembles
the logic by which women are supposed to consent to sex. Preclude
the alternatives, then call t he sole remaining option "her choice." The
point is t hat the alternatives are precluded prior to the reach of the
chosen legal doctrine. They are precluded by conditions of sex, race,
and class - the very conditions the privacy frame not only leaves
tacit but exists to guarantee. 2 9 4

This critique is correct in its observation that the power of privacy
doctrine in poor women's lives is constrained by liberal notions of
291

S ee supm notes 213 & 240.

2 9 2 44 8
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U.S.

297 (1980).

!d . at 316.
29 4 C . MACKI NNON, supra note r9 , at 101 (e mphasis in origina l). Rhonda Copelon a nd
Rosalind Petchesky draw similar conclu sions a bout the limits of liberal pri vacy theory in th e
abortion fun din g context. SeeR. PETCHESKY , supra note 235, at 295-302; Copelon , supra note
251, at 322-25 .
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freedom. First, the abstract freedom to choose is of meager value
without meaningful options from which to choose and the ability to
effectuate one's choice . 2 9 5 The traditional concept of privacy makes
the false presumption that the right to choose is contained entirely
within the individual and not circumscribed by the material conditions
of the individual's life . 296 Second, the abstract freedom of self-definition is of little help to someone who lacks the resources to realize
the personality she envisions or whose emergent self is continually
beaten down by social forces . Defining the guarantee of personhood
as no more than shielding a sphere of personal decisions from the
reach of government - merely ensuring the individual's "right to be
let alone" - may be inadequate to protect the dignity and autonomy
of the poor and oppressed. 2 97
The definition of privacy as a purely negative right serves to
exempt the state from any obligation to ensure the social conditions
and resources necessary for self-determination and a utonomous decisionmaking. 298 Based on this narrow view of liberty, the Supreme

29 5 See supra note 2 I r.
Dependence on public largesse, fo r example, means that the governm ent can determine whi ch rep rod u ctive decisions indi ge nt wome n may carry out. Th e
S upreme Court erroneously reasoned in the abortion fundin g decisions that the denial of public
fu ndin g imposes no new obs tacle to reproductive choice. If a n ind ige nt woman is unabl e to
effec tu ate her decision to have an abortion , the Court argued , her inab ility is due to her poverty
and not the government's funding policy. See Maher v. Roe , 432 U.S. 464, 4 74 (I977l; Harri s,
448 U .S. at 3 !4-I S. But t h e Co urt 's reasoning ignores th e real-life effec t of th e gove rnmen t's
fundin g choices on poor women . An indigent wo man w ho is unable to pay for either childbirth
or abo rtion has no choice but to accep t the government's determination. By fundin g only o ne
op tion , the gove rnment has really made the woman's choice for her. See Binion, supra note
230, at I9; Goldstein, A Critique of the Abort ion Funding Decisions: On Private Rights in the
Publi c Sector, 8 HASTIN GS CONST. L. Q. 3I3, 3IS-I7 (I98I); Tribe, The Abortion Fundin g
Conundnmz: Inalienable Righ ts, Af.finnative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV.
L. REv. 330, 336-37 (I98S).
2 9 6 See R. PETCHESKY , supra n ote 235, at 295-302 ; Copelan, supra note zsr , at 322 - 23.
297 Thomas Grey notes t h e distin ctio n between t he civ il rights and civil liberties perceptions
of the personality: "The former tend to see the personali ty as more socially-constructed , hen ce
soc iall y destructible ; th e latte r see it as more naturally self-re liant a nd au tonom ous. " T. Grey,
C iv il Righ ts vs. Civil Liberties: The Case of Disc rimin a tory Ve rbal Harass ment I- 2 (Mar. I 990)
(un p ublished manuscript on file at th e H a r vard L aw School Library); see also Colker, supra
note r3o, at ror9 - 2 I (describing a group-based and individual-based concep t of the "authentic
self "). While relying on the ri ght to individual autonomy, I am suggesting that the legal doctrine
that protects it should adopt what Professo r Grey calls th e civil ri ghts pers pective of p erso nh ood.
T his co ncept of autonomy protects the right to make certain choices but recognizes that ch oices
a re made in the context of a commu nity a nd in relation to others. See T. Grey, supra, at I . I
also recognize that the individu al's pe rson hood may be denied as a means of attackin g the
comm uni ty as a whole and that the co mmunity's sup port may be necessary for nurtu rin g the
individual's perso nh ood. I do not be lieve that the recognition of these connectio ns betwee n the
indiv idua l and the community are inhere ntl y inconsistent with the notion of autonom y.
29 8 See Copelon, supra note 251 , a t 323. For a th orough cri tiq ue of the prevailing conception
of th e Co n stitution as solely a ch arter of negative li berties, see Bandes , The Negative Con sti tution: A Critique. 88 MI CH. L. REv. 227r ( r990 ).
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Court has denied a variety of claims to government aid. 299 MacKinnon notes that "[i]t is apparently a very short step from that which
the government has a duty not to intervene in to that which it has
no duty to intervene in. "300 An evolving privacy doctrine need not
make the step between these two propositions. Laurence Tribe, for
example, has suggested an alternative view of the relationship between
the government's negative and affirmative responsibilities in guaranteeing the rights of personhood: "Ultimately, the affirmative duties of
government cannot be severed from its obligations to refrain from
certain forms of control; both must respond to a substantive vision of
the needs of human personality. "301
This concept of privacy includes not only the negative proscription
against government coercion, but also the affirmative duty of government to protect the individual's personhood from degradation and to
facilitate the processes of choice and self-determination. 302 This approach shifts the focus of privacy theory from state nonintervention
to an affirmative guarantee of personhood and autonomy. Under this
post-liberal doctrine, the government is not only prohibited from punishing crack-addicted women for choosing to bear children; it is also
required to provide drug treatment and prenatal care. Robin West
has eloquently captured this progressive understanding of the due
299

See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196
(1989) ("(O]ur cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative
right to governmental aid , even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or
property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.").
30 0 C. MACKINNON, supra note 19, at 96 (emphasis in original); see also Copelan, supra note
251, at 316 (observing the "sharp tension between the liberal idea of privacy as the negative
and qualified right to be let alone as long as nothing too significant is at stake and the more
radical idea of privacy as an affirmative liberty of self-determination and an aspect of equal
personhood"); West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, supra note 14, at 646-47
("(P]rogressives tend to support an 'affirmative' understanding of the liberty protected by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment .
while conservatives read the clause as
protecting 'negative liberty' only, i.e., the right to be free from certain defined interferences.").
301 L. TRIBE, supra note r64, § 15-2, at 1305.
3° 2 Clearly the affirmative guarantee of personhood and autonomy must have boundaries.
'vVe cannot expect the government to provide every means necessary to fulfill each individual's
sense of identity. Moreover, increased government involvement in the processes of individual
choice and self-determination may create new dangers. Finally, there may be advantages to
using privacy doctrine to protect against the government's abuse of power and using other
concepts, such as equality, to achieve more affirmative goals. It is beyond the scope of this
Article to explore all of the questions raised by the new privacy jurisprudence. My point here
is to acknowledge the limitations of current privacy doctrine and to suggest the ingredients of
a doctrine that overcomes them. Others have explored the scope of the positive role of government in correcting material inequalities. See, e.g., Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term
- Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv.
7, 9-13 (1969) (proposing a vision of social justice in which citizens are entitled to "minimum
protection against economic hazard"); Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New
Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065,
1090-96 ( r 97 7) (interpreting National League of Cities as a recognition of affirmative rights).
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process clause in which privacy doctrine is grounded: "The ideal of
due process, then, is an individual life free of illegitimate social coercion facilitated by hierarchies of class, gender, or race. The goal is
an affirmatively autonomous existence: a meaningfully flourishing,
independent, enriched individual life. "303
This affirmative view of privacy is enhanced by recognizing the
connection between privacy and racial equality. The government's
duty to guarantee personhood and autonomy stems not only from the
needs of the individual , but also from the needs of the entire community. The harm caused by the prosecution of crack-addicted mothers is not simply the incursion on each individual crack addict's decisionmaking; it is the perpetuation of a degraded image that affects
the status of an entire race. The devaluation of a poor Black addict's
decision to bear a child is tied to the dominant society's disregard for
the motherhood of all Black women. The diminished value placed
on Black motherhood , in turn, is a badge of racial inferiority worn
by all Black people . The affirmative view of privacy recognizes the
connection between the dehumanization of the individual and the
subordination of the group .
Thus, the reason that legislatures should reject laws that punish
Black women's reproductive choices is not an absolute and isolated
notion of individual autonomy. Rather, legislatures should reject these
laws as a critical step towards eradicating a racial hierarchy that has
historically demeaned Black motherhood . Respecting B lack women 's
decision to bear children is a necessary ingredient of a community
that affirms the personhood of all of its members . T he ri ght to
reproductive autonomy is in this way linked to the goal of racial
equality and the broader pursuit of a just society. This broader dimension of privacy's guarantees provides a stronger claim to government's affirmative responsibilities.
Feminist legal theory, with its emp hasis on the law's concrete effect
on the condition of women, calls for a reassessment of traditional
privacy law. It may be possible , however, to reconstruct a p rivacy
jurisprudence that retains the focus on a utonomy and personhood
while making privacy doctrine effective. 304 Before dismissing the right
of privacy altogether, we should explore ways to give the concepts of

\Vest, Progressiv e and C onsen;ative Constitutionalism , supra note 14, at 707.
The word "privacy" m ay be too imbued with limiting liberal interpretation to be a usefu l
desc ripti ve term. "Privacy" co nn otes shielding from in tr usion a nd thus may be sui tab le to
desc rib e solely the ne gati ve prosc ri pti on against gove rnm ent ac ti on . l\1o reo ver, the word con jures up the public- private d ichoto my. "Li berty," o n th e other ha nd , has more potentia l to
include the a ffirmati ve duty of gove rnm e nt to ensure the co nd itions necessar y for au to nomy and
self-defini tion . In reco nstru ctin g the con sti tutio nal gua ra ntees I have been disc ussin g, it may
be more appropri a te to re ly on the broader concep t of "li be rty. " See A . A LLE N, supra note r 6o,
at gS-r o r (discussing th e d ifferences be tween "liberty" a nd "privacy") .
303
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choice and personhood more substance. 305 In this way, the continuing
process of challenge and subversion 306 the feminist critique of
liberal privacy doctrine, followed by the racial critique of the feminist
analysis - will forge a finer legal tool for dismantling institutions of
domination.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

Our understanding of the prosecutions of drug-addicted mothers
must include the perspective of the women whom they most directly
affect. The prosecutions arise in a particular historical and political
context that has constrained reproductive choice for poor women of
color. The state's decision to punish drug-addicted mothers rather
than help them stems from the poverty and race of the defendants
and society's denial of their full dignity as human beings. Viewing
the issue from their vantage point reveals that the prosecutions punish
for having babies women whose motherhood has historically been
devalued.
A policy that attempts to protect fetuses by denying the humanity
of their mothers will inevitably fail. 307 We must question such a
policy's true concern for the dignity of the fetus, just as we question
the motives of the slave owner who protected the unborn slave child
while whipping his pregnant mother. Although the master attempted
to separate the mother and fetus for his commercial ends, their fates
were inextricably intertwined. The tragedy of crack babies is initially
a tragedy of crack-addicted mothers. Both are part of a larger tragedy
of a community that is suffering a host of indignities, including,
significantly, the denial of equal respect for its women's reproductive
decisions.
It is only by affirming the personhood and equality of poor women
of color that the survival of their future generation will be ensured.
30 5 In answering the critical legal studies' critique of rights, Patricia Williams notes that
oppression is the result not of "rights-assertion," but of a failure of "rightscommitment." Williams, supra note 243, at 424 (emphasis in original). In the same way, the
concepts of choice, personhood, and autonomy that are central to privacy doctrine are not
inherently oppressive, any more than is the concept of equality (which has also been interpreted
in ways that perpetuate hierarchy and domination). It is the "constricted referential universe,"
id. at 424, of liberal notions - such as negative rights, neutral principles, the public-private
dichotomy, and formal equality - that have limited privacy's usefulness for attaining reproductive freedom. See Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 334-35 (1987) (demonstrating how women and people of
color can adopt and transform constitutional text for radical objectives).
306 See supra p. 1464.
30i I hear this false dichotomy in the words of Muskegon, Michigan, narcotics officer AI Van
Hemert: '"If the mother wants to smoke crack and kill herself, I don't care.· .
'Let her die,
but don't take that poor baby with her."' Hoffman, supra note 5, at 34
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The first principle of the government's response to the crisis of drugexposed babies should be the recognition of their mothers' worth and
entitlement to autonomy over their reproductive lives. A commitment
to guaranteeing these fundamental rights of poor women of color,
rather than punishing them, is the true solution to the problem of
unhealthy babies .

